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This Article explores the revival of interest in consumer
protection in the United States, and the impact of this revival on
the consumer movement. The Author examines the influence
that politicalorganizationsand institutionshave upon the final
shape and content of consumer law in the United States and
European Union.
The Article begins with a general
introduction to institutional theory across academic disciplines
and to the institutional environment and arrangements in
which consumer lawmaking proceeds in the United States and
Europe. Next, the Article assesses consumer initiatives in the
United States and the European Union, focusing on deceptive
advertising, unfair contract terms, consumer credit, and
consumer access to justice problems. The Author's assessment
illuminates the institutional factors that shape consumer
protection initiatives. Finally, the Article discusses the limits of
traditional United States perspectives on consumer law. The
Article concludes that an institutional approach provides a
better and more accurate framework for analyzing consumer
issues.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The growth in the consumer economy, globalization, innovations
in technology and communications, and efforts to modernize U.S.
uniform commercial laws all have contributed to renewed concerns
over legal regulation of consumer transactions. In the United States,
this revival of interest in consumer protection seeks to build upon
and perhaps to reinterpret issues raised and initially resolved
decades earlier, a time during which consumer issues were at the
forefront of legal attention domestically.1 It was during the 1960s

1.
See generally Ralph J. Rohner, Multiple Sources of Consumer Law and
Enforcement (Or: "Still in Search of a Uniform Policy"), 9 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 881, 88289 (1993) (discussing growth of consumer movement in the 1960s and consumer
legislation that emerged from movement). Nonetheless, consumer protection issues
and legal protection of consumers have been a source of concern throughout history.
See, e.g., Paul B. Rasor, Biblical Roots of Modern Consumer Credit Law, 10 J. L. &
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and 1970s that many of the principal consumer protection statutes
were enacted. 2 The renewed attention to consumer protection issues
suggests that the consumer movement may be undergoing a new
transformation.
Many areas of legal doctrine and social policy are beginning to
converge in recent debates. For U.S. lawyers and scholars, perhaps
the most important development involves the Uniform Commercial
Code (the UCC or the Code), which is in the final stages of a
substantial revision project. 3 Throughout this lengthy project, the
revisions have served as the central stage on which a battle has been
taking place over consumer protection issues in the areas covered by
the UCC. The revisions have provoked critical analysis not only of
the substance of revisions to the Code but also of its sponsors, the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (the
NCCUSL) and the American Law Institute (the ALl). 4 Consumer
issues also have had a significant impact on the NCCUSL and ALI
approval process and on the consideration of approved Official Drafts
by state legislatures.5 Related to this development, a growing body of

RELIGION 157 (1993-94) (delineating biblical regulations affecting consumer credit);
Richard J. Barber, Government and the Consumer, 64 MICH. L. REv. 1203, 1205-06
(1966) (presenting medieval consumer protection measures).
2.
Rohner, supra note 1, at 884-85.
3.
Over the past decade nearly every article of the UCC has undergone
revision, although the status of the revisions within NCCUSL and with state
legislatures differs with the article. To find the status of current NCCUSL revision
projects see NCCUSL, Introductions & Adoptions of Uniform Acts, at
http-J/www.nccusl.orgluniformacts.asp. Articles 2 and 2A, the last major articles to be
revised, are currently in the midst of a lengthy and politically controversial drafting
process. See infra note 5.
4.
For sustained critiques, from a consumerist perspective, of the NCCUSL
revisions to Articles 3 and 4 of the UCC see Kathleen Patchel, Interest Group Politics,
Federalism, and the Uniform Laws Process: Some Lessons from the Uniform
Commercial Code, 78 MINN. L. REV. 83 (1993) (discussing how uniform laws process
can be affected by interest groups, and applying this thesis to UCC revisions); Edward
L. Rubin, Thinking Like a Lawyer, Acting Like a Lobbyist: Some Notes on the Process of
Revising Articles 3 and 4, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 743 (1993) (presenting an account of
political biases of drafting processes by participant in process). For more general
discussions of consumer issues raised in the Code revision project see Jean Braucher,
Foreward- Consumer Protectionand the Uniform Commercial Code, 75 WASH. U. LQ.
1 (1997) (providing current articles on Code revisions and consumer issues); Kerry
Lynn Macintosh, Liberty, Trade, and the Uniform Commercial Code: When Should
Default Rules Be Based on Business Practices?, 38 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 1465 (1997)
(developing framework for determining extent of UCC involvement in consumer
issues); Fred H. Miller, Realism Not Idealism in Uniform Laws-Observationsfrom the
Revision of the UCC, 39 S. T.
L. REV. 707 (1998) (presenting an account of revision
efforts); A. Brooke Overby, Modeling UCC Drafting, 29 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 645, 650-68
(1996) (discussing current perspectives on relationship between consumer protection
and Code revision process).
5.
Notable events in the revision process included the refusal of the NCCUSL
and ALI to approve the draft revisions of Article 2 (Sales) presented at the July 1999
meeting, allegedly due to business pressures, which resulted in the resignation of the
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literature employs positive political theory or economic analysis to
evaluate the role of private lawmaking entities such as the NCCUSL
and the ALI to assess their susceptibility to special interest group
influences and to analyze the impact that such influences might have
on NCCUSL and ALI products. 6 Thus, significant questions of
institutional design and legislative methodology 7 have arisen out of
the UCC experience.
The uniform laws debate raises a much broader structural issue
regarding the proper allocation of governmental authority in
regulating consumer transactions. While other parts of the world,
such as the European Union, are moving more toward more
centralized forms of government, the United States has experienced a
movement away from federal regulation toward state and local
government regulation.8 This trend is antithetical to the strongly

Reporters to the project. See generally William J. Woodward, Jr., PrivateLegislation in
the United States-How the Uniform Commercial Code Becomes Law, 72 TEMP. L. REV.
451, 460 n.39 (1999) (describing events of Summer 1999 relating to Article 2 revisions).
A new drafting committee thereupon was formed. Press Release, NCCUSL, ALl and
NCCUSL Announce New Drafting Committee for UCC Articles 2 and 2A (Aug. 18,
1999), available at http:/www.nccusl.org/pressrel/pr-18-99.asp.
After objections to
proposed Article 2B governing intangibles were raised, the ALI and NCCUSL
ultimately abandoned the effort to include the Article in the UCC and the NCCUSL
alone sponsored what is now the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act
(UCITA) as a separate uniform act. Bruce Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Uniformity,
Choice of Law and Software Sales, 8 GEO. MASON L. REV. 261, 265-66 (2000) (detailing
history of UCITA). To examine a web site detailing the progress of UCITA in the state
legislatures see UCITA, UCITA Online, at http'J/www.ucitaonline.com. In the case of
the 1990 revisions to Articles 3 and 4, consumer rights advocates were able to securo
non-uniform amendments and, in some cases, delay enactment of revised Articles 3 and
4 after a concerted political lobbying campaign against the revisions. Overby, supra
note 4, at 646, 646 n.8.
6.
See, e.g., Edward J. Janger, PredictingWhen the Uniform Laws Process Will
Fail: Article 9, Capture, and the Race to the Bottom, 83 IOWA L. REV. 569 (1998)
(discussing regulatory capture theory applied to private legislatures); Larry E. Ribstein
& Bruce H. Kobayashi, An Economic Analysis of Uniform State Laws, 25 J. LEGAL
STUD. 131 (1996) (presenting economic analysis of NCCUSL products); Alan Schwartz
& Robert E. Scott, The PoliticalEconomy of Private Legislatures, 143 U. PA. L. REV.
595 (1995) (theoretical analysis of private legislatures); Robert E. Scott, The Politics of
Article 9, 80 VA. L. REV. 1783 (1994) (discussing political influences in Article 9 revision
process).
7.
Cf NEIL K. KoMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES (1994) (comprehensive
account of institutional choice); Edward L. Rubin, The New Legal Process, the Synthesis
of Discourse, and the MicroanalysisofInstitutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1394 (1996)
(overview of institutional theory in law).
8.
See, e.g., William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, The New Economics of
JurisdictionalCompetition: Devolutionary Federalism in a Second-Best World, 86 GEO.
L.J. 201, 203 (1997); Peter H. Schuck, Introduction: Some Reflections on the
Federalism Debate, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 1 (1996). The term "devolutionary" usually
refers to "federal withdrawal from a regulatory field in favor of exclusive occupation by
state and local governments." Bratton & McCahery, supra, at 203 n.1. Devolution is
not necessarily synonymous with "deregulation," although devolution does lead to
deregulation at the federal level. Id. "Devolution" of federal power also conceivably
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federalized ideology that supported much of the earlier consumer law

initiatives. Moreover, somewhat paradoxically, the experience with
the UCC suggests the possibility that more vigorous federal
involvement in the area of consumer transactions may be warranted,
if not necessary. 9 The new consumer debate therefore will not only
involve issues of private legislatures and consumer values, but will
raise federalism concerns as well. Federalism concerns are not
isolated solely to the UCC and its treatment of consumer issues.
Even foundational issues such as the validity of electronic
signatures-which recently was addressed by Congress through The
Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act'°-now

invoke substantial

questions concerning

the proper

roles of

international, federal, and state bodies in regulating commercial
transactions."
Finally, the view that consumer law is a domestic and internal
matter is being called into question.' 2 Consumer law has acquired an
increasing transnational and international dimension as a result of
economic integration and technological developments such as ecommerce. This suggests that the traditional roles played by legal
organizations in consumer lawmaking perhaps ought to be
questioned in light of increasing globalization. The impact of
globalization on domestic U.S. contract law is often overlooked or deemphasized. U.S. law reform efforts all too frequently proceed
without serious reflection on the manner in which other jurisdictions
have addressed and resolved similar issues. The new consumer
debate, at least in the United States, often seems to continue the

could occur when public power is moved to private actors, through, for example,
privatization. See Schuck, supra, at 2.
9.
To the extent substantial lack of uniformity exists in areas critical to
interstate commerce, the potential for federal intervention in the area increases, due to
the benefits created by a uniform, or harmonized, law. Cf Paul B. Stephan. The
Futility of Unification and Harmonization in InternationalCommercial Law, 39 VA. J.
INT'L L. 743, 744-51 (1999) (identifying benefits of unification projects). Some authors
have suggested that federal intervention is also warranted when a uniform laws
process does not satisfactorily advance held policy goals. Edward L. Rubin, Types of
Contracts, Interventions of Law, 45 WAYNE L. REV. 1903, 1925 (2000) (suggesting
federal action when state law fails to attain an efficient result).
10.
The Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commercial Act, Pub. L
No. 106-229, 114 Stat. 464 (2000).
11.
Compare S. 761, 106th Cong., § 6(c) (1999) (evidencing intent not to
preempt significantly consistent state law on digital signatures and validating
enactment of NCCUSL uniform acts) with H.R. 1714, 106th Cong. § 102(B) (1999)
(proposing alternative preemptive effect of federal digital signature law). For the final
act's preemption provision, see § 102, 114 Stat. 464, supra note 10.
12.
See, e.g., David Harland, The United Nations Guidelines for Consumer
Protection: Their Impact in the First Decade, in CONSUMER LAW IN THE GLOBAL
ECONOMY: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS 1, 2-3 (lain Ramsay ed., 1997)
(discussing differing perspectives on consumer protection as internal state matter and
on when international involvement is justified).
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disturbing practice of avoidance, although the parochialism of the
NCCUSL and ALI in the drafting of the UCC is a long-observed
phenomenon. 13 Whether consumer protection issues ultimately will
become global, rather than local, matters is, of course, a debatable
question. Nonetheless, the shift in emphasis from the local to the
global generally in the last decade merits consideration when
evaluating U.S. perspectives on consumer law.
Consumer law in the future most likely will play out on a field
vastly different from that which showcased the liberal, rightsoriented consumer debate decades ago. The reassessment of the
NCCUSL and the ALI, the reordering of federal and state priorities
in the United States, increasing internationalization, and the
potential transformation of consumer issues from matters of local
concern to matters of some global import all indicate that a radical
reinterpretation of consumer law may eventually emerge. In the
United States, this reinterpretation will raise broad issues regarding
the state uniform laws process, consumer rights, and economic
justice-which provide the source for much of the argument to datebut also much more subtle questions of institutional design,
organizational competence, federalism, law and technology, and the
global economy.
This Article addresses these issues by examining the influence
that political organizations and institutions apart from consumer
values and ideology potentially have on the final shape and content of
consumer law in the United States and European Union. The Article
advances and employs a comparative and institutional approach
toward analysis rather than a more traditional "consumer values"
approach. To evaluate the impact that organizational and
institutional constraints play in the creation of consumer law, the
Article contrasts consumer protection issues being addressed in the
emerging dual system of the European Union with similar initiatives
in the United States. While the European Union's characterization
as a federal state, in a comprehensive and unitary sense, is in and of
itself a provocative and much debated question beyond the scope of

13.
See Peter Winship, As the World Turns: Revisiting Rudolf Schlesinger's
Study of the Uniform Commercial Code "In Light of ComparativeLaw", 29 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 1143, 1144-46, 1158-62 (1996) (discussing comparative perspectives on
commercial law and raising issue of need for comparative studies of consumer
legislation). To examine some recent exceptions to the general dearth of comparative
approaches to domestic U.S. consumer and transactional law see Symposium, Teaching
Sales Law in a Global Context: The ReciprocalInfluence of Domestic Sales Law (Article
2) on PrivateInternationalLaw (CISG and UNIDROIT) and Private InternationalLaw
on Revised Article 2, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1925 (1998) (presenting essays on reciprocal
influences of domestic and international law); Andreas P. Reindl, Consumer Contracts
and European Community Law, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 627 (1997) (providing a comparative
assessment).
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this Article, 14 the structures of the EU establish a layer of
centralizing legal bodies 15 that makes an analogy to the United
States federal system useful.
These contrasting parallel
developments suggest that institutional, organizational, and social
constraints apart from consumer ideology play a significant role in
shaping consumer law. Thus, the traditional focus on consumer
values not only inaccurately describes legislative action, but is also
inadequate for guiding the future development of consumer law.
The Article begins with a general introduction to institutional
theory across academic disciplines, including legal theory, and to the
institutional environment and arrangements' 6 in which consumer
lawmaking proceeds in the United States and Europe. 17 The Article
continues with an assessment of consumer initiatives in the United
States and the European Union in the areas of deceptive advertising,
unfair contract terms, consumer credit, and consumer access to
justice problems.' 8 Such an assessment illuminates the institutional
factors that act to shape consumer protection initiatives. The Article
then discusses the limits of traditional U.S. perspectives on consumer
law and concludes that an institutional approach provides a better
and more accurate framework for analyzing consumer issues. 19

14.
Compare Koen Lenaerts, Federalism: Essential Concepts in Ecolutn-The
Case of the European Union, 21 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 746, 746-52 (1998) idescribing
attributes of federal state and assessing EU in that light) with Manfred Zuleeg, What
Holds a Nation Together? Cohesion and Democracy in the United States and in the
European Union, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 505, 526 (1997) (rejecting conception of EU as a
federal state). See generally J.H.H. WEILER, THE CONSTITUTION OF EUROPE (1999)
(numerous essays exploring European integration and evolving visions of EC
constitutional principles).
15.
See infra text accompanying notes 69-93.
16.
Because institutional theory is less well-developed in legal theory than in
other scholarly areas, see infra text accompanying notes 43-44, use of accepted
institutional terminology in legal analysis is necessarily imprecise. The term
"Institutional Environment" as it would apply to legal-as opposed to economicanalysis might refer generally to "political, social, and legal ground rules* that define
the context in which consumer lawmaking proceeds and that establish the basis for
consumer lawmaking. Cf OLIVER E. WILLIAMiSON, THE MECHANIsMS OF GOVERANCE
378 (1996) (defining "institutional environment" in New Institutional Economics as
"[the rules of the game that define the context in which economic activity takes place.
The political, social, and legal ground rules [that) establish the basis for production,
exchange, and distribution."). "Institutional Arrangements," by contrast, might refer to
governance structures.
Cf id. (defining "institutional arrangements" as "tihe
contractual relation or governance structures between economic entities that defines
the way in which they cooperate and/or compete."); see alzo id. at 325-28
(distinguishing institutional environment and arrangements).
17.
See infra Part II.
18.
See infra Part Ill.
19.
See infra Part IV.
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II. INSTITUTIONS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND VALUES IN CONSUMER
PROTECTION

The issue concerning why consumer transactions ought to be
regulated at all, or at least treated differently from other types of
contracts, provides the customary departure point for an inquiry into
consumer protection issues. Under a traditional framework for
analysis of consumer protection law, particular legal provisions or
acts-for example, court opinions or statutes-are assessed in the
context of how effectively they advance the values or goals that
justified intervention in the first place. Alternative approaches can
be compared or contrasted by critical evaluation of their efficacy in
furthering established or held goals of consumer policy. From the
prescriptive side, the traditional framework seeks to guide law
reform efforts by advancing specific proposals for reform that would
further such held goals. When competing or contradictory goals exist,
20
the focus shifts to the normative and descriptive power of each goal.
This traditional framework nonetheless provides a picture of
consumer law and lawmaking that is, at best, incomplete. It has two
weaknesses, each of which feeds off the other.
First, the
predominance of consumer law values and policies as the foundation
for the traditional framework often acts to exclude political processes
and organizations as immaterial, or at least operates on the
assumption that all lawmaking bodies are roughly equivalent. In
other words, it all too frequently assumes that the source of the law is
insignificant-that, for example, whether a rule originated with the
courts or agencies, with state or federal legislatures, with non-legal
customs, or with private legislatures is irrelevant or tangential to the
inquiry. Second, the power of any traditional value-based analysis
increases or decreases in direct relation to the acceptance of the
evaluative theory by the community. That is, when a strong
consensus exists within the legal community as to the particular
goals supporting regulation, the strength of the evaluation obviously
increases.
For example, if substantial agreement exists that
accommodating informational imbalances between consumers and
businesses ought to be the goal of legal intervention, a provision's
failure or success in furthering that goal becomes much more
authoritative than in cases in which divergent views on proper social
policy uncomfortably coexist. Where such divergences exist, coupled
with the disjunction that often exists between values and
institutional
processes and organizations,
the traditional
perspective's weaknesses become enhanced because it provides

20.

See KOMESAR, supra note 7, at 4.
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limited guidance for accommodating deeply divergent views across a
multiplicity of organizations and their underlying environments.
As will be addressed in this section, legal processes and
organizations matter profoundly and in a manner that the traditional
perspective frequently fails to recognize. It also will be argued that
the assumption of wide acceptance of the social goals of consumer
protection is tenuous. The section begins with a discussion of an
emerging institutional approach toward evaluating law and
lawmakers, an approach that connects values with institutions and
organizations and that provides an alternative to traditional
methodologies. 2 1 The section continues with a detailed discussion of
the formal political organizations 22 involved in consumer lawmaking
and constraining principles 23 under which those organizations act.
A. An InstitutionalPerspective on Consumer Law

As with most areas of law, there is no widely held consensus on
the underlying basis for regulating consumer transactions or on the
goals of consumer law. The primary theoretical rationales usually
advanced for consumer protection legislation might fall into three
general categories: (1) policing for market failures or, in a related
vein, creating efficient markets for consumer goods and services; (2)
advancing ethical goals; or (3) paternalist protection of the
consumer. 24 A market failure rationale for consumer protection
relies upon the belief that government should only intervene in
otherwise private transactions when a market failure exists and
when the benefits of legal intervention exceed the costs. 25 Efficiency
itself might be viewed as the goal of consumer law. 20 Ethical
21.
See infra Part l.A.
22.
See infra Part II.B.
23.
See infra Part 1.C.
24.
lAIN RAMSAY, CONSUMER PROTECTION 34 (1989).
25.
See, e.g., GERAINT HOWELLS & THOMAS WILHELMSsON, EC CONSMER LAW
(1997) (describing market failure as principal aim of EC consumer protection lawl.

Market failures, however, must be "curable" from a cost perspective to justify
interventionist legislation. As lain Ramsay states:
A potential market failure occurs when there is a failure of one of the
conditions for the optimal operation of a competitive market. This
provides a necessary but not sufficient reason for government
intervention. It is not sufficient because it is necessary to estimate the
effect of the failure on the price, quality and quantity of the goods or
services provided in the market and to identify the costs of remedying
the failure. Government intervention is not costless and an estimate
must be made of the costs and benefits of intervention and the potential
impact of a remedy on the market and the behaviour of those affected.
RAMSAY, supra note 24, at 36.
Cf Robert E. Scott, The Uniformity Norm in Commercial Law: A
26.
Comparative Analysis of Common Law and Code Methodologies, in THE

1228

VANDERBILTIOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL. 34:1219

rationales for consumer protection law look to theories of justice to
support intervening into consumer transactions. 27 In this vein, a
reason for intervening on ethical grounds might be one of distributive
justice, a desire to transfer wealth from wealthy corporate sellers to
less wealthy consumer buyers.
Distributive justice goals most
frequently are invoked when transactions involving poorer consumers
are at issue.2 8 Shared community values also might provide an
ethical justification for regulating consumer contracts, 2 9 as might,
alternatively, norms such as preserving individual autonomy,
dignity, or respect. 30 Norms such as individual liberty and autonomy
underlie rules couched in terms of "freedom of contract" and are
raised to support non-intervention in consumer contracts. Finally, a
paternalist basis for intervention suggests that a consumer's
individual preferences to some degree ought to be overruled by
government judgment on the matter.3 1 For many, this rationale has
strongly negative connotations that make paternalist justifications
for intervention unacceptable within the dominant Western liberal
tradition.3 2 This is most particularly so because, in overruling a

JURISPRUDENTIAL FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW 149, 150 (Jody
S. Kraus & Steven D. Walt eds., 2000) (making claim that primary role of the state in
"uniformly enforcing commercial contracts is to regulate incomplete contracts
efficiently"); cf also Introduction, in THE JURISPRUDENTIAL FOUNDATIONS OF
CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW 1 (asserting that "[e]fficiency is the dominant
theoretical paradigm in contemporary corporate and commercial law scholarship").
27.
See, e.g., Thomas Wilhelmsson, Consumer Law and Social Justice, in
CONSUMER LAW IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY, supra note 12, at 217, 218-19 (discussing
relationship between consumer law and theories of corrective and distributive justice).
28.
See id. at 225-28 (discussing redistributive impact of consumer law on
disadvantaged consumers).
29.
See, e.g., Anthony D. Taibi, Banking, Finance, and Community Economic
Empowerment: Structural Economic Theory, Procedural Civil Rights, and Substantive
Racial Justice, 107 HARv. L. REV. 1463 (1994) (advancing communitarian theory for
interpretation and enforcement of Community Reinvestment Act).
30.
See generally RAMSAY, supra note 24, at 47-54.
31.
Id. at 54. The proper definition of the term "paternalism," and determining
the scope of legally acceptable paternalist intervention, is the matter of great debate.
See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and PaternalistMotives in Contract and Tort
Law, With Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal BargainingPower, 41
MD. L. REV. 563 (1982) (discussing paternalist intervention); Anthony T. Kronman,
Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763 (1983) (discussing types of
paternalist regulation and their philosophical derivation).
Professor Anthony
Kronman, for example, suggests that paternalist rules are those "that prohibit[] an
action on the ground that it would be contrary to the actor's own welfare. . . ." Id. at
763.
32.
See, e.g., Jean Braucher, Defining Unfairness: Empathy and Economic
Analysis at the Federal Trade Commission, 68 B.U. L. REV. 349, 381-94 (1988)
(exploring "extreme discomfort" felt by others with paternalist intervention and with
Professor Kronman and Kennedy's perspectives on paternalism); Richard W. Garnett,
Why Informed Consent? Human Experimentation and the Ethics of Autonomy, 36
CATH. LAW. 455, 491 (1996) (discussing history of hostility to paternalist intervention).

2001]

AN INSTITUTIONAL ANAL YSIS OF CONSUMER L4 W

L229

consumer's personal appraisal of a desired course of action,
paternalism poses a threat to individual liberty.33
Given these differing, and sometimes conflicting, justifications
for consumer protection law, lawmaking bodies might demonstrate
widely disparate approaches toward particular substantive consumer
issues based solely upon the held ideology. For example, one
legislative body might view intervention in consumer contracts as
justifiable only where an identified and effectively curable market
failure exists. A government with a more communitarian agenda
might, by contrast, lean toward advancing communitarian goals
through intervention. Even if some agreement on the underlying
basis for intervention is present, that fact alone would not eliminate
the possibility of non-uniform legal approaches to any specific
consumer matter. Broad standards and values such as "efficiency,"
"equality," or "community" might in themselves suggest more than
one legislative or judicial approach to the same issue. Consumer
law's imperfection, therefore, stems first from the broad array of
ideological premises on which it is based. The existence of a great
number of formal and informal legal organizations involved in
regulating consumer transactions heightens uncertainty.
Such uncertainties suggest that an institutional framework for
analysis of consumer protection issues might provide a viable and
much more concise alternative to the traditional values-based
approach. Institutional theory is most developed in the area of
economics, in which two schools, New Institutional Economics (NIE)
and Old Institutional Economics (OIE), have generated extensive
scholarship in the area.34 One of its most prominent articulations
can be found in the work of NIE theorist Douglass North, whose work
on the evolution of institutions serves as an offshoot of neoclassical
economic theory. 35 Although NIE perhaps lacks a well-defined or

33.
See, e.g., Kronman, supra note 31, at 764-65 (discussing moral concerns
arising from paternalist laws); Braucher, supra note 32, at 392 (raising liberal fears of
"ad hoc" paternalism); Garnett, supra note 32, at 491 (raising "our culture's dedication
to the force of consent. . . ."). Professor Eyal Zamir recently has argued that
paternalistic legislation is not necessarily incompatible with efficiency goals, and thus
the two are not in some cases inconsistent bases for evaluating legislation. Eyal Zamir,
The Efficiency of Paternalism, 84 VA. L. REV. 229, 230 (1998). Zamir suggests that
paternalistic rules that overrule individual consent in some cases may also be efficienL

I&. at 284-85.
34.
See generally MALcOL

RUTHERFORD, INSTITUTIONS IN EcoNOMics: THE
OLD AND NEW INSTITUTIONALISMT (1994) (comparing NIE and OIE).
35.
See, e.g., DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND

EcONOInc PERFORMANCE (1990) (developing theory of institutional change);
WilLIAMISON, supra note 16 (NIE analysis of economic organization); see alzo OLIVER E.
WILLIAmsON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM

1-14 (1985)

development of institutional approach in economics scholarship).

(tracing

Even within NIE,

substantial differences and distinctions exist among NIE theorists.

See generally
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unified agenda and is comprised of many sub-disciplines, 3 6 the basic
focus of an institutional approach is on institutions-the rules of the
game, in that they are "humanly devised constraints that shape
human interaction." 37 As developed by North in the context of the
evolution and development of institutions, a spectrum of political,
economic, social, and educational organizations exists in any society
that may, among other roles, influence the evolution of formal and
informal institutions. 38 North begins by recognizing the reality that
"[e]conomic (and political) models are specific to particular
constellations of institutional constraints that vary radically both
through time and cross sectionally in different economies."3 9 In
addition, an institutional perspective in transaction cost economics
attempts to explore the impact that bounded rationality and
imperfect information have on human behavior, 40 recognizing also
that ideas and ideology may impact human behavior. 41 Finally, any
modeling of the political or economic process must incorporate the
institutions-or, from above, the rules of the game-invoked by that
process in a way frequently absent from mainstream economic
modeling. 42 According to NIE proponents, acceptance of these tenets
acts to invigorate otherwise static neoclassical economic theory by
incorporating incomplete information and social and human realities
into economic modeling and analysis.
While institutional analysis has made substantial inroads in
other academic disciplines in addition to economics, 4 3 the full

RUTHERFORD, supra note 34 (detailing NIE perspectives in areas such as formalism,
individualism, rationality, evolution, and efficiency).
36.
RUTHERFORD, supra note 34, at 2-3 (placing public choice, game theory,
transaction cost economics, and numerous other areas in NIE).
37.
NORTH, supra note 35, at 3.
38.
Id. at 4-5 (distinguishing institutions-rules-and organizations-players).
39.
Id. at 110.
40.
Id. at 111; see also WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF GOVERNMENT, supra
note 16, at 4-10 (outlining basic analytic assumptions of transaction cost economics and
distinguishing those assumptions from tenets of orthodox analysis).
41.
NORTH, supra note 35, at 111. North's views regarding ideology are not
universally held across NIE. RUTHERFORD, supra note 34, at 45-46 (presenting both
North's perspective on role of ideology in institutional development and contrary
views).
42.
NORTH, supra note 35, at 112.
43.
Rubin, supra note 7, at 1413-38 (tracing in detail the development of
institutional analysis in economics and continental social theory and advancing
methodology for legal analysis); see also Robert E. Goodin, Institutions and Their
Design, in THE THEORY OF INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 1, 2-19 (Robert E. Goodin ed., 1996)
(discussing current literature regarding institutional design in history, sociology,
economics, political science, and social theory). Professor Goodin advances several
complementary propositions that, he argues, apply to the new institutionalism across
academic disciplines, although the application occurs in varying degrees. Id. at 19-20.
For example, institutional theory commonly holds that individuals and groups pursue
projects within a collectively constrained context. Id. at 19. "T'hose constraints take
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parameters of a mature and highly developed institutional
methodology for law are still largely unexplored. 44 Two major themes
on institutional legal analysis have emerged from the legal literature
to date. As an innovative perspective on legal analysis, institutional
legal theory might start with the proposition that it is often
impossible to separate the goals of law from the critical evaluation of
the institutions that are selected to accomplish those goals.4 z This
also suggests, however, as an initial matter, that the substance and
form of law cannot be viewed apart from the political or economic
organizations or actors that generate the law in question, whether
courts, legislatures, agencies, or markets.
In legal analysis,
"[elmbedded in every law and public policy analysis that ostensibly
depends solely on goal choice is the judgment, often unarticulated,
that the goal in question is best carried out by a particular
institution."46
The decision of who, or what, decides is an
institutional choice, which "reflects the reality that the decision of
who decides is really a decision of what decides." 47 It is therefore
impossible, posits institutional legal theory, to separate goal choice
from institutional-rule--choice or organizational-lawmakerchoice in the rigid manner that the traditional normative framework
so often presupposes. 4s Given that the institution or organization
chosen to advance a goal will impact the manner in which the goal
ultimately might shape public policy, institutional and organizational
choices must be evaluated against the goal to be attained and are
49
essential, rather than tangential, components of legal analysis.
An institutional approach toward legal analysis recognizes, first,
that the issue of whether any specific legal provision or act

the form of institutions-organized patterns of socially constructed norms and
roles... , which impact both institutional actors and social life as well. Id. at 19-20.
44.
Developed articulations of an institutional methodology for legal analysis,
which vary significantly as to focus and underlying approaches, include KOMESAa,
supra note 7; PETER MORTON, AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LAW (1998); Rubin, supra
note 7; cf also Kenneth W. Abbott, Commentaries on Kenneth W. Abbott, Modern
InternationalRelations Theory: A Prospectus in Retrospect and Prospect, 25 YALE J.
INT'L LAW 273, 273-76 (2000) (collecting articles and discussing impact of institutional
and regime theory in international law and international relations).
45.
KOMESAR, supra note 7, at 5.
46.
Id.
47.
Id. at 3.
48.
Id. at 5.
49.

Id.

Goal choice and institutional choice are both essential for law and public policy.
They are inextricably related. On the one hand, institutional performance and,
therefore, institutional choice can not be assessed except against the bench
mark of some social goal or set of goals. On the other, because in the abstract
any goal can be consistent with a wide range of public policies, the decision as
to who decides determines how a goal shapes public policy.
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successfully accomplishes a particular held policy goal or value is
actually a radically incomplete picture of a much deeper question.
Rather, goals and values are advanced through legal rules and,
perhaps more importantly, by way of the actions of formal and
informal organizations that operate within their own peculiar
constraints and within the background rules that establish their
institutional environments.5 0 Any truly comprehensive analysis of
law requires consideration of the underlying institutional
arrangements and environment in a way that traditional legal
perspectives frequently overlook, if not completely ignore.
From a prescriptive, law reform perspective, under an
institutional framework, the social policy aims of consumer law must
be balanced with the question of institutional and organizational
choice-for example, by considering whether a goal is better
accomplished through a particular type of rule and through a
particular mechanism, such as markets, state legislatures, federal
legislatures, and so forth. An institutional perspective in this way
moves beyond the sole emphasis on consumer values towards a much
richer framework that addresses the question of the interrelationship
between values, the structure, design, or use of existing or new legal
institutions-rules-that advance the underlying values, and the
formal and informal organizations through which those institutions
emerge. By making this transition, institutional legal theory shifts
attention from policy norms or ethical values alone to a focus on the
complex relations between legal rules, the players involved, the
institutional environment, and norms and values.
Institutional theory's second theme provides important limits to
the descriptive power of traditional norm-based legal analysis.
Somewhat akin to the relation between neoclassical economics and
NIE, an institutional model of legal analysis reflects a move away
from a formally rational legal system that creates and applies
universal rules. 51 While social policy, ethical norms, or consumer
ideology certainly continue to be relevant factors in evaluating
consumer law, other factors such as the governance structure in
which legal decisions are made must also be taken into account.
Thus, normative values are somewhat reduced in weight and
recognized as necessarily an incomplete representation of law.5 2 An

50.
For rough working definitions of "Institutional Environment" and
"Institutional Arrangement" as used in this Article, see supra note 16.
51.
Cf Gunther Teubner, Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern Law,
17 LAW & SOCY REv. 239, 240 (1983). As defined by Teubner, "[a] formal rational legal
system creates and applies a body of universal rules, and formal rational law relies on
a body of legal professionals who employ peculiarly legal reasoning to resolve specific
conflicts." Id.
52.
Cf 3 THIERRY BOURGOIGNIE & DAVID TRUBEK, CONSUMER LAW, COMMON
MARKETS AND FEDERALISM IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES vii (1987) (indicating

.an analysis of the normative content of legal rules and policies-while still central-
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institutional perspective on the lawmaking process begins from no
fixed position. 53 The perspective would not choose between efficiency
and social justice, for example, but might use, as one institutional
theorist has suggested, "the methodologies derived from both
approaches to explore the development of a common metric by which
efficiency and social justice could be compared, balanced, and traded
off in real institutional settings."5 4
By moving away from modern views of law based on formal
rationality and static universal norms into a post-modern regime for
evaluating law and legal acts based on particulars and concepts of fit,
an institutional legal perspective brings with it two consequences.
With respect to law reform proposals, it demands that political and
legal organizations and structures receive consideration along with
the traditional legal emphasis on social policy goals or ethical norms,
as discussed above. 55 As a by-product of this stance, in evaluating
products of legal organizations, institutional theory de-emphasizes
formal evaluative criteria in favor of a much more open-ended and
flexible inquiry into the relations and fit among institutions,
organizations, and values. 5 6 This approach to evaluation of legal
systems and their products presents a more completely post-modern
theory of law, with an "emphasis on the particular and [al . . .
corresponding distrust of generalizations."5 7 General theories are not
necessarily to be avoided, but "rather, the point is that discourses
based on different normative premises are most likely to converge
when they address specific issues. Within a given culture, the
empirical grounding that specificity provides vll tend to generate
areas of common understanding and communication, if not complete
substantive agreement."58
The area of consumer law-with its disputed ideological bases
and broad array of lawmaking bodies-provides a rich area for
application of institutional theory.
Addressing any consumer
protection issue under an institutional framework, however, becomes
a much more complex task. Even the very basic question of whether
a person ought to qualify as a "consumer" to be protected by a statute
could conceivably invoke subtle, but in fact enormously complex,
balancing issues. For example, under the U.K.'s Fair Trading Act
1973, "consumers" protected by the statute are persons who are
supplied or seek to supply goods or services in the course of business

can give only a partial picture of the function and shortcomings of law in its societal

context.").
53.

Rubin, supra note 7, at 1429.

54.
55.
56.
57.

IM at 1430.

58.

Id.

Id at 1429-33.
Id. at 1430.
Id at 1425.
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of the supplier, but who do not receive goods or services in the course
of a business. 59 Attention to inequality of bargaining power, a
concern evoking ethical and market failure issues, is reflected in such
a definition by contrasting the experience of the enterprise seller with
the inexperience of the individual person buyer. Yet, by way of
contrast, other legislative approaches expand the definition of
"consumer" to encompass persons engaged in transactions of a
personal nature, without regard for the status of the supplier. 60 This
approach reflects less of a concern for the unequal status of the
parties and focuses more on the inexperience of the buyer, perhaps
incorporating more paternalist notions into the concept of the legally
protected "consumer."
Thus, even with regard to this very primary definitional issue of
what in fact a legally protected "consumer" is, ambiguity may arise
from disparate views on the underlying theoretical goals of consumer
law. The issue can be framed in terms of regulating an unequal
relationship between business enterprises and individuals in an era
of mass-market consumption or as one of protecting persons involved
in personal transactions. A traditional perspective would leave it at
that. While acknowledging that widely varying policy goals and
values are an important component of any legal inquiry, an
institutional legal framework also moves on to demand that
institutional choice, organizational dynamics, and structural and
cultural values that provide an equally important part of the
institutional environment of law be considered along with social
policy goals and values. Under an institutional perspective, in the

59.
Fair Trading Act, 1973, c. 41, § 137(2) (U.K.). The Fair Trading Act defines
a 'consumer' as: any person who is either(a) a person to whom goods are or are sought to be supplied (whether by
way of sale or otherwise) in the course of a business carried on by the person
supplying or seeking to supply them, or
(b) a person for whom services are or are sought to be supplied in the
course of a business carried on by the person supplying or seeking to supply
them,
and who does not receive or seek to receive the goods or services in the
course of a business carried on by him.
Id.
60.
See, e.g., UNIF. CONSUMER SALES PRACTICES AcT § 2(1), 7A U.L.A. 210
(1970), which provides as follows:
"[Clonsumer transaction" means a sale, lease, assignment, award by chance, or
other disposition of an item of goods, a service, or an intangible [except
securities] to an individual for purposes that are primarily personal, family, or
household, or that relate to a business opportunity that requires both his
expenditure of money or property and his personal services on a continuing
basis and in which he has not been previously engaged, or a solicitation by a
supplier with respect to any of these dispositions.

20011

AN INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF CONSUMER L4 W

examples given above, it would not be considered inconsequential
that the former definition emerged from a national legislature now
part of a broader economic union or that the latter was proposed by a
private legislature involved in U.S. state law reform efforts.
Consideration of these actual lawmaking bodies and the institutional
constraints that guide their deliberations and actions, along with
consumer values, provides a complex subtext to the analysis.
Traditional legal approaches and institutional legal approaches
in this way provide competing frameworks for evaluating consumer
protection law. As suggested above, an institutional framework
requires a deeper analysis of the actual political organizations
involved in lawmaking than the traditional perspective. The focus of
this Article is on the factors apart from values in the United States
and European Union that may act to impact consumer protection
issues and the final form of consumer protection law. Thus, to
provide a more comprehensive foundation for an institutional
analysis of consumer law in those jurisdictions, the remainder of this
section first outlines briefly the formal organizations involved in
consumer lawmaking. 61 A discussion of the institutions6 2that
constrain and guide the activities of those organizations follows.
B. PoliticalOrganizations
Consumer law emerges from a variety of lawmaking bodies. In
the United States, for example, legislation is the task of either the
federal government or state and local governments.
Federal
legislation has the obvious benefits of national uniformity, while
state law, by contrast, can vary widely from state to state. To reduce
interstate lack of uniformity, private legislatures such as the
NCCUSL may propose uniform laws and model acts to state
legislatures. The ALI Restatements of Law also seek to synthesize
and modernize state law. The most successful NCCUSL and ALI
project is perhaps the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). The UCC's
success in the state legislatures, however, is quite unique among
NCCUSL products-many other NCCUSL uniform laws, particularly
those in the consumer law area, have not been widely accepted by the
states.63
The bodies responsible for enforcing U.S. consumer law change
depending on the law being enforced. Courts can enforce statutory
rights created by state or federal legislatures. Agencies also are key
players in enforcing consumer rights. For example, the FTC plays a

61.

See infra text accompanying notes 63-93.

62.

See infra text accompanying notes 94-105.

63.

See Ribstein & Kobayashi, supra note 6, at 134-35, 135 fig. 1 (adoption

history of NCCUSL uniform laws).
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substantial role in enforcing federal laws that proscribe unfair and
deceptive acts and practices, an issue discussed later in this Article in
the context of deceptive advertising."4 State agencies enforce state
laws that also prohibit unfair or deceptive trade practices.6 5 A more
recent legislative technique has been the encouragement of parallel
federal and state enforcement of federal consumer law. 66 Regulation

of consumer transactions at the judicial level may begin with
application of the common law. For example, Article 2 of the UCC
does not apply to services contracts.6 7 Via the UCC or common law,
courts enforce the obligation of good faith and fair dealing and the
doctrine of unconscionability, both of which frequently act to protect
consumers. 68 Common law actions such as those based on deception
or misrepresentation are within the ambit of judge-made law.
Alternatively, areas may be covered by state legislation such as the
UCC or state consumer statutes that give rise to statutory claims. As
interpreters of consumer and commercial statutes, courts can play a
simple, but significant, role.
Similarly diverse organizations and institutions exist in the
European Union (EU). Consumer law in the EU stems generally
from two sources, the first, and primary, being Member State law. 69
Reference to the governmental structures of the individual Member
State will determine what constitutes Member State law. 70 Thus, in
a common law jurisdiction such as the United Kingdom, the Member
State law is comprised of both the common law and statutory law of
the United Kingdom and emerges from the unique lawmaking
organizations of that state. 71 Because the European Union is also

64.
See infra text accompanying notes 121-35.
65.
See, e.g., UCSPA §§ 5-9 (procedure for state agency investigation powers
and enforcement of deceptive practice statute); see also infra notes 130-35 and
accompanying text (discussion of state anti-deception legislation).
66.
E.g., Credit Repair Organizations Act § 410, 15 U.S.C. § 1679h (2000);

Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 6103
(2000).
67.
UCC § 2-102 (1995) (scope of application).
68.
See infra text accompanying notes 163-67.
69.
See Reindl, supra note 13, at 628-35 (describing Member State involvement
in consumer protection).
70.
An index of current Member States, with brief descriptions of those states'
political systems, can be found at http'//www.europa.eu.intlabc/eu_members/indexen.htm.
71.
As the following quotation sets out in greater detail,
Under the Common Law, the principles of contract and the tort of negligence
have been applied to protect consumers, particularly in respect of the sale of
goods and the supply of services. Effective protection under the law of contract,
however, is considerably limited by the rules of privity, under which a person
must be a party to a contract to acquire rights or obligations under it ....
There are considerable difficulties in establishing negligence and a claim for
damages is limited in that damages for pure economic loss may not be
recoverable at all. Common Law remedies have gradually been overtaken by
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comprised of a significant number of civil law jurisdictions, from a
national perspective Member State law differs not only as to
substance, but also with respect to fundamental epistemological and
ontological issues devolving from the civil versus common law
72
traditions.
Community law is the second source for legal protection of
consumers in the EU and has the potential for becoming the key
means by which a comprehensive consumer policy will be established
throughout Europe.7 3 The emerging importance of Community law
brings with it significant political and jurisprudential issues as the
focus of European Union consumer policy moves away from the
individual Member States to the European Community at large.74
Such a shift in perspective not only brings with it the issues of
transnational-Member State-relations and supranational-local

versus central-concerns, but also introduces a new set of institutions
and actors into the framework. 75 The first general area of consumer

increasing consumer protection legislation, including the Misrepresentation Act
1967, the Sale of Goods Act 1979, the Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982,
and the Consumer Protection Act 1987.
European Community law has had an increasing influence on United
Kingdom law. The European Communities Act 1972 applied existing directly
applicable or effective Union law to the United Kingdom and provides for
Community Regulations and Directives to be incorporated into United Kingdom
law. Regulations are directly applicable in Member States and, therefore, they
do not need national legislation to give them effect. Directives are not directly
applicable, and they do require a Member State to alter its law. Directives are
the most important source of Community law in the United Kingdom, and these
are incorporated into the domestic law by statute or statutory instrument.
Lynn West & Norton Rose, United Kingdom, in 2 INTERNATIONAL CONSUMER
PROTECTION UK-I-1 (Dennis Campbell ed., 1995).
72.
See, e.g., HoWELLS & WILHELssON, supra note 25, at 19-25. For example,
the connection between law and legal culture results in national perspectives that are
inextricably linked to local culture. See id. at 20-21. Arguably, the differing
perspectives that the common and civil lawyer bring to bear concerning law,
interpretation, legal systems and legal institutions, and organizations render
superficial comparisons between Member States more difficult, if not perhaps
impossible. Cf id. at 22-24.
73.
Reindl, supra note 13, at 635-36 (advocating need for Community
involvement).
74.
See infra text accompanying notes 99-116 (discussing dynamics of
centralization).
75.
The principal political bodies in the European Union are the Court of
Justice, the European Parliament, the Council, and the Commission. To examine a full
description of EU Institutions and their role see Institutions ofthe European Union, at
http'/www.europa.eu.intrmst-en.htm; see also Lenaerts, supra note 14, at 752-75
(discussing comprehensively the composition of and decision-making procedures for EU
bodies). The 1992 Treaty on European Union (TEU), which amended the 1957 EEC
Treaty (the Treaty of Rome) establishing the former European Economic Community
(EEC), was the most significant step toward a unified Europe and renamed the EEC
the European Community (EC). The Treaty of Amsterdam, effective as of May 1, 1999,
amended the TEU, among other things, and represents the most recent articulation of
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protection law in the EU falls into the classification of "negative
consumer law."76 Negative law devolves from Community action
under what is now Article 28 of the Treaty of Amsterdam, 77 which
provides that "[qluantitative restrictions on imports and all measures
having equivalent effect shall[, without prejudice to the following
provisions,] be prohibited between Member States."78 Article 29
contains a similar provision for exports. 79 The provisions in Articles

28 and 29, however, do not prevent Member States from
implementing prohibitions or restrictions that are justified on a
number of non-market public policy grounds.8 0 In a series of cases
over the years, the European Court of Justice has found Member
State consumer-related law impacting imports and exports across the
EU to be either compatible or incompatible with these treaty
provisions-or their predecessors. 8 ' By means of this still developing
jurisprudence on the free movement of goods, the ECJ has emerged
as a principal player in consumer protection across the EU.

principles of Community integration. To read discussions of the numerous treaties,
and
the
treaties
themselves,
see
European
Treaties,
at
httpJ/www.europa.eu.int/abc/treaties-en.htm.
76.
GERAINT G. HOWELLS & STEPHEN WEATHERILL, CONSUMER PROTECTION
LAW 85 (1995) (using phrases "negative" and "positive" law in consumer protection
area); Reindl, supra note 13, at 635 (same).
77.
"Treaty of Amsterdam" refers to the recently effective amended TEU, with
the latter modifying the EEC Treaty. See TREATY OF AMSTERDAM AMENDING THE
TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, THE TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES and CERTIFIED RELATED ACTS, Oct. 2, 1997, O.J. ((340) 1 (1977)
[hereinafter TREATY OF AMSTERDAM]; see also supra note 75.
78.
TREATY OF AMSTERDAM art. 28.
79.
Id. art. 29.
80.
Id. art. 30. Article 30 provides that:
[tihe provisions of Articles 28 and 29 shall not preclude prohibitions or
restrictions on imports, exports or goods in transit justified on grounds of public
morality, public policy or public security; the protection of health and life of
humans, animals or plants; the protections of national treasures possessing
artistic, historic or archaeological value; or the protection of industrial and
commercial property. Such prohibitions or restrictions shall not, however,
constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on
trade between Member States.
Id. Although consumer protection measures do not fall within the scope of Article 30,
the ECJ has found that they constitute a "mandatory requirement" under the Cassisde
Dijon formula, thus allowing such measures when justified, necessary, and
proportional. See Reindl, supra note 13, at 630-32 (discussing the Cassis de Dijon test
and related case law).
81.
See Reindl, supra note 13, at 629-32 (collecting ECJ rulings on free
movement provisions); see also Laurence W. Gormley, Two Years After Keck, 19
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 866 (1996) (discussing application of, and changing ECJ attitudes
toward, what is presently Article 28 of the Treaty of Amsterdam). A watershed ECJ
decision in 1993 interpreting present Article 28 significantly limited earlier case law
when it concluded that neutral Member State regulation of marketing or selling
arrangements fell outside of Article 28's proscriptions. See Keck & Mithouard, [19931
ECR 1-6097 (Joined Cases C-267/91 & C-268/91) (interpreting prior Article 30).
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Until Maastricht and the Treaty on European Union (TEU),8 2
however, no direct treaty language expressly allowed the creation of a
Community-wide consumer policy,8 3 although the lack of any express
authorization did not by any means prevent a proactive Community
stance toward consumer protection issues. Under Article 100 of the
Treaty of Rome,84 the Council had authority to pursue harmonization
legislation in consumer transactions by providing as follows:
The Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from the
Commission and after consulting the European Parliament and the

Economic and Social Committee, issue directives for the approximation
of such laws, regulations or administrative provisions of the Member
States as directly affect the establishment or functioning of the common
85
market.

Article 100a, added in 1987, gave similar power for the functioning of
the internal market and allowed qualified majority voting in areas of
Council competence.8 6 Many of the Directives8 7 discussed later in
this Article were issued through the Council's Article 100 and Article
100a power.
In spite of the limited express authority initially given to EU
bodies to regulate affrmatively in the area of consumer protection at
the supranational level, consumer protection matters as a general
policy concern have been a focus of EU-wide attention for many
years. To a great extent the position taken is one that, at least by the
rhetoric, consistently favors the consumer. Beyond harmonization
legislation authorized by Articles 100 and 100a, the agenda for an
aggressive stance favoring the consumer was set by a 1975 Council
Resolution concerning the rights of consumers.8 8 The resolution
articulated five basic consumer rights: (1) the right to protection of
health and safety; (2) the right to protection of economic interests; (3)

82.

See supra note 75.

HOWELLS & WEATHERILL, supra note 76, at 95; HOWELLS & WILHELMASSON,
supra note 25, at 6-7.
84.
See supranote 75.
85.
EEC Treaty art. 100.
86.
EEC Treaty art. 100a; see also HOWELLS & WEATHERELL, supra note 76, at
83.

83, 97.

87.
Directives, in and of themselves, have no immediate legal force in Member
States. See TREATY OF AMSTERDAM art. 249 (stating effect of regulations, directives,
decisions, recommendations, and opinions). Rather, Member States are obligated by
treaty to implement the published directive into their national law. Id.; see also Reindl,
supra note 13, at 646-51 (discussing Directives and supporting ECJ case law).

Unimplemented directives-those not transposed into national law-have no effect in
suits between individuals, but may result in Member State liability for damages to an

individual for the state's failure to act. Id at 647-48; see also Faccini Dori v. Recreb Srl
[1995] All ER (EC) 1 (1994) (Case C-91/92) (discussing effect of unimplemented

directives).
88.
Council Resolution of 14 April 1975, OJ 1975 C92/1; see also Reindl, supra
note 13, at 637 (describing agenda set by 1975 resolution and subsequent action plans).
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the right of redress; (4) the right of information and education; and
(5) the right of representation-the right to be heard.8 9 Programs of
Community-wide activities building from these basic consumer rights
followed in subsequent years. 90 Thus, prior to 1992, actions at the
Community-wide level were largely directed toward internal market
concerns, but within the larger context of a maturing conversation
concerning consumer rights and protection in the Community at
large.
In 1992, the TEU seemed to expand the express authority of EU
political bodies to create Community-wide consumer protection
measures that were not based upon Article 100 and 100a
harmonization authority. 91
Community institutions' powers to
regulate in consumer areas were, arguably, expanded even further in
1999 under the Treaty of Amsterdam. 92 These provisions have left an

89.
See Council Resolution of 14 April 1975, OJ 1975 C92/1, $13.
90.
See HOWELLS & WILHELMSSON, supra note 25, at 9-13 (discussing
initiatives following 1975 Resolution); see also Jules Stuyck, European Consumer Law
After the Treaty of Amsterdam: Consumer Policy In or Beyond the Internal Market, 37
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 367, 377-79 (2000).
91.
Article 129a of the TEU provided:
1. The Community shall contribute to the attainment of a high level of
consumer protection through:
(a)
measures adopted pursuant to Article 100a in the context of the
completion of the internal market;
(b)
specific action which supports and supplements the policy
pursued by the Member States to protect the health, safety and economic
interests of consumers and to provide adequate information to consumers.
2. The Council, acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in
Article 189b and after consulting the Economic and Social Committee, shall
adopt the specific action referred to in paragraph 1(b).
3. Action adopted pursuant to paragraph 2 shall not prevent any Member
State from maintaining or introducing more stringent protective measures.
Such measures must be compatible with this Treaty. The Commission shall be
notified of them.
TEU art. 129a. In addition, the TEU contained a new chapter on consumer
protection-Chapter XI of the EC Treaty-and expressly mentioned strengthening
consumer protection as a Community activity in Article 3, arguably expanding
Community powers. Stuyck, supra note 90, at 379-82; see also Reindl, supra note 13, at
641 (discussing debate concerning legal significance of TEU Art. 129a).
92.
See Economic and Social Committee, Opinion on the 'Consumer policy
action plan 1999-2001', 1999 O.J. (C 209) 1, 2.2 ("[tlhe Amsterdam Treaty expanded the
scope for an effective consumer policy.") (citing TREATY OF AMISTERDAM1 art. 153);
Stuyck, supra note 90, at 382-88 (discussing possible impact of Treaty of Amsterdam on
EU consumer issues). Much of the controversy revolves around Article 153 of the
Treaty of Amsterdam, revising Article 129a of the TEU. For example, Article 153
provides in part:
1. In order to promote the interests of consumers and to ensure a high level
of consumer protection, the Community shall contribute to protecting the
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open and provocative question regarding the appropriate boundaries
between, on the one hand, Member State institutions and local
policies toward consumer protection and, on the other hand, EU
institutions and Community policy. The progression from the 1975
Council Resolution to the Treaty of Amsterdam evidences an
increasing centralization of consumer policymaking at the
Community level, if only in theory. The TEU's shifting of Community
priorities in consumer protection from regulation of the internal
market alone to the establishment of an independent Community
consumer policy and subsequent developments in the Treaty of
93
Amsterdam provide a textual basis for the exercise of such powers.
The growing strength of Community political bodies suggests that a
reorientation of issues from the national to the supranational arenas
may be occurring, although increasing centralization should not be
viewed as a surprising by-product of the emergence of centralizing
organizations and institutions.
Whether in the United States or in the European Union, the
relations between formal organizations and those organizations'
respective spheres of jurisdiction and competence add another
dimension to legal action. Moderating principles exist that vll
constrain and delimit formal activity in consumer areas. The next
section addresses those principles.
C. ConstrainingPrinciples
In the United States, constitutional and political constraints act
to balance consumer legislation among the domestic institutions
mentioned in the previous section. For example, with respect to
commercial legislation where uniformity is desirable, the NCCUSL
and the federal government each are possible lawmaking bodies by

health, safety and economic interests of consumers, as well as to promoting

their right to information, education and to organise themselves in order to
safeguard their interests.
2. Consumer protection requirements shall be taken into account in defining
and implementing other Community policies and activities.
TR.EATY OF AMsTERDAM art. 153(1)-(2). Most significantly, the entirely new reference to
consumer "rights" to information, education, and organization, and the placement of

consumer "interests" into a separate paragraph suggest the potential for Communitywide and centralized actions under the Treaty of Amsterdam than otherwise were
authorized by the TEU. Id art. 153(1). See Stuyck, supra note 90, at 385.
93.
See, e.g., HOWELLS & WILHELASSON, supra note 25, at 7-9 (describing preMaastricht consumer protection policy as largely directed toward common, and then
internal, markets, and raising possibility that, post-Maastricht, development of
autonomous, non-market based Community consumer policy may emerge); Stuyck,
supra note 90, at 389-400 (discussing relationship between pre-Maastricht policies and
post-Treaty of Amsterdam possibilities).
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which such legislation might be accomplished. 94 Concerns such as
federalism, 95 efficiency or equity, 96 consumer justice, 97 or
uniformity 98 are frequently raised as important considerations that
not only ought to influence the substantive legal products of these

legislatures, but also the basic decision of whether to intervene at all
into the matter. For example, state versus federal action and federal

versus agency action are regulated by the constitution, considerations
of political comity, and-in the case of agencies-enabling legislation.

Judicial deference towards legislative acts provides another example
of a domestic political constraint in the United States.

While in the United States the constraints that act to delimit
and define the boundaries between the formal political bodies
discussed in this section are accepted-albeit fluid and at times hotly
disputed-in the European Union, the boundaries of power are still

unsettled and ambiguous after the TEU and Treaty of Amsterdam.
Views on the allocation of power might fairly be said as falling

anywhere along a broad spectrum of enhancing local diversity, on the
one hand, to complete Community centralization, on the other. For

example, the following excerpt advances a structural approach to the
relationship

among Member

State

autonomy, Community-wide

consumer policy, and consumer markets:
Europe's greatest strength is its diversity. It is essential to both the
aims and the methods of consumer policy: essential to its aims, because
a proper response to individual needs implies diversification of
production; essential to its methods, because the policy must be
sufficiently flexible to allow particular responses to particular
circumstances. Community policy should not seek to impose uniform
solutions for problems, but to establish the structures within which
solutions can be implemented at the appropriate level, be it
Community-wide, national, regional or local. Experience has taught
the Community that the right level of government at which to execute a

94.
The United States Congress has constitutional authority to regulate in
matters of interstate commerce. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Uniform laws of the
NCCUSL are not binding in any respect, but rather proposed for formal enactment by
state legislatures. Although there is no prohibition that prevents the NCCUSL from
proposing a law to the federal government, and indeed some have suggested the
NCCUSL consider this possibility, the NCCUSL traditionally has acted as, and indeed
was constituted to be, representative of state governments. See, e.g., Patchel, supra
note 4, at 160-62.
95.
See, e.g., Overby, supra note 4, at 684-87 (discussing importance of
federalism in drafting uniform state laws).
96.
See, e.g., Edward Rubin, Efficiency, Equity, and the Proposed Revision of
Articles 3 and 4, 42 ALA. L. REV. 551 (1991) (critiquing UCC revisions in terms of
equity and efficiency).
97.
See, e.g., Yvonne W. Rosmarin, Consumers-R-Us: A Reality in the U.C.C.
Article 2 Revision Process, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1593 (1994) (providing a consumer
activist perspective on Article 2 revisions).
98.
See, e.g., Raymond T. Nimmer, Uniform Codification of Commercial
ContractLaw, 18 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TEcH. L.J. 465 (1992) (discussing advantages
of uniformity in contract law codification efforts).
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particular function is the lowest level at which the job can be efficiently
99
done.

By contrast to a "diversity" approach that rejects a strongly
centralized conception of Community-wide involvement, an
independent Community-based approach is also possible.10 0
Principles of subsidiarity and proportionality most likely wll be
the regulatory devices that ultimately will balance the proper spheres
of authority between EC bodies and Member States. Subsidiarity, or
the principle that "the right level of government to execute a
particular function is the lowest level at which the job can be done," is
expressly incorporated into the Treaty of Amsterdam.1 ) Facially,
subsidiarity appears to be a relatively straightforward concept. For
U.S. lawyers, the principle of subsidiarity can be roughly analogized
as incorporating many of the issues couched domestically in terms of
In spite of the similarity, the operation and
federalism. 10 2
parameters of the principle of subsidiarity as a justiciable principle in
moderating the roles and respective powers of national and EU
bodies has received limited attention. 10 3 The TEU and Treaty of
99.

EAMoNN LAWLOR, INDIVIDUAL CHOICE AND HIGHER GROWTH: THE AIM OF

CONSUMER POLICY IN THE SINGLE IMARKET 14 (2d ed. 1988) (citation omitted).
100. See, e.g., HOWELLS & WILHELMSSON, supra note 25, at 320-23 (discussing
potential for Community-wide consumer policy oriented around "legitimate
expectation" and raising possible conflicts among that approach, diversity, and
harmonization goals).
TREATY OF AMSTERDAM art. 5. Article 5 provides:
101.
The Community shall act within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by
this Treaty and of the objectives assigned to it therein.
In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community
shall take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and
insofar as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved
by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the
proposed action, be better achieved by the Community.
Any action by the Community shall not go beyond what is necessary to
achieve the objectives of this Treaty.
Id. Article 5 of the Treaty of Amsterdam is a renumbered iteration of Article 3b of the
TEU. See supra note 75 (discussing amendment of the TEU). The TEU was the first to
introduce subsidiarity in the text. See Stuyck, supra note 90, at 382.
See Edward T. Swaine, Subsidiarityand Slf-Interest: Federalism at the
102.
European Court of Justice, 41 HARV. INTL L.J. 1, 1-7 (2000) (discussing American and
European interpretations of term "federalism" and its relation to Community principle
of subsidiarity); see also Lenaerts, supra note 14, at 746-49 (incorporating variants of
American federalism into EU analysis); see also W. Gary Vause, The Subsidaraty
Principlein European Union Law American FederalismCompared, 27 CASE W. RES. J.
INT'L L. 61, 62 (1995) (drawing analogy between subsidiarity and American federalism,
but suggesting also that "subsidiarity does not have an exact counterpart in the
American system of federalism.").
See George A. Bermann, Taking SubsidiaritySeriously: Federalism in the
103.
European Community and the United States, 94 COLJM. L. REV. 331, 362-64, 379-83,
403-07 (1994); see also Christian Kirchner, The Principleof Subsidiarity in the Treaty
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Amsterdam fail to make explicit in their texts the goals that
subsidiarity would advance, a silence that allows further
ambiguity.10 4 The boundaries that subsidiarity ultimately might
place between Member State and Community bodies is therefore still
an open question.' 05 In the face of such ambiguity, subsidiarity could
be interpreted between the broad extremes of diversity and
centralization suggested earlier.
It could be interpreted as a
principle intended to advance expansive local power and discretion
or, at the other extreme, as a principle containing a centralizing
concept that has precisely the opposite effect of totalism.' 0 6 In a
similar vein, subsidiarity may advance diversity and pluralism

on European Union: A Critique from a Perspective of ConstitutionalEconomics, 6 TUL.
J. INT'L & COMP. L. 291, 299-300 (1998) ("subsidiarity principle has been praised as an
instrument to stop further erosion of Member States' sovereignty, and it has been
criticized because of its impracticability for judicial review.").
104.
In 1992, a Protocol regarding application of the principles of subsidiarity
and proportionality was annexed to the EC Treaty. See PROTOCOL ON THE APPLICATION
OF

THE

PRINCIPLES

OF

SUBSIDIARITY

AND

PROPORTIONALITY,

available

at

http'//v-w.europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/treaties/dattams treaty-en.pdf, 105 (last modified
Dec. 14, 2000) (incorporated by reference in the Treaty of Amsterdam). In examining
whether an action is consistent with subsidiarity, the following guidelines are
considered: (1) whether the issue under consideration has transnational aspects which
cannot be satisfactorily regulated by Member State action; (2) whether Member State
action alone or lack of Community action would conflict with Treaty requirements or
otherwise significantly damage Member States' interest; and (3) whether Community
action would produce clear benefits, whether by reason of scale or effects, when
compared to action at the Member State level. Id.
(5). In spite of existing
ambiguities, subsidiarity has had practical effect in the area of consumer law. For
example, concerns over subsidiarity have led to withdrawal or amendment of several
Commission consumer proposals. See Stuyck, supra note 90, at 382.
105.
Kirchner, supra note 103, at 300-02. The principle does not in itself
allocate power between the EC and Member States but rather acts to distribute power
in mixed fields of competencies. Id. at 300.
106.
Ian Ward, Identity and Difference: The European Union and
Postmodernism, in NEW LEGAL DYNAMICS OF EUROPEAN UNION 15, 24 (J. Shaw & G.
More eds., 1995); Vause, supra note 102, at 66 (subsidiarity preserves local selfdetermination and local government accountability).
The indeterminacy of
subsidiarity, for some writers, reflects its postmodern nature:
It [subsidiarity] is a 'constitutional' term which is not supposed to be
determinable, at least not objectively. A conceptual text whose ambition is to
sow confusion of meanings is a peculiar technology, or so it seems to those of us
brought up in a jurisprudential tradition of analytic rigour. Moreover,
subsidiarity is particularly important because the establishment of its identity,
either as a mechanism for totalization or for respecting the particular, will
determine the nature of the European legal and constitutional order. It may be
a postmodern incarnation of difference as justice, or alternatively, it may turn
out to be the technology which will 'silence' the particular.
Ward, supra, at 24. Ward sees the EU as "best understood as a postmodern text, and
perhaps as a postmodern polity," and views a central goal of post-modernism as one of
"radically decentraliz[ing] power from the nation-state and relocat[ing] it at its most
basic societal level." Id. at 15, 24.
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within the European Union 10 7 or act contrary to diversity through

harmonization, and therefore homogenization, actions by Community
institutions. It also simply could be argued that the principle's
extreme vagueness renders it an ineffective regulatory principle
incapable of practical and certain application, albeit a pleasant
enough catchword.
Even if understood as integral to accomplishing the goals of
democratic legitimization' 08 and for enhancing accountability in the
decision-making processes of the Community, 109 subsidiarity's
operation in the area of consumer transactions-most often
considered matters of local concern"10-is even more problematic in
light of its ambiguity. The extremes mentioned above suggest widely
different approaches toward consumer protection issues. Viewed as a
diversity-enhancing preference toward the local, the final goal might
be for the Community to emphasize structures that ultimately
"delegate responsibility to the most effective agents in the process:
Under this interpretation,
the consumers themselves.""'
subsidiarity would be a regulative principle that weighs against

107.

According to Ward:

The ready acceptance of subsidiarity as a decentralizing and anti-federalist
concept which can better facilitate a pluralist, and thus more participatory
democratic Europe is, of course, immanently critical in a strictly jurisprudential
sense. Nicholas Emiliou has championed subsidiarity as a mechanism for legal
and political 'diversification', albeit as presented in a more identifiably 'cooperative' federal legal structure.
Id. at 26.
108.
109.

K irchner, supranote 103, at 302.
Imelda Maher, Legislative Reuiew by the EC Commission: Reuision without

Radicalism, in NEW LEGAL DYNAMICS OF EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 106, at 237.

110. See supranote 12 and accompanying text. Because subsidiarity deals with
exercise of power within the EU, the subnational level is not part of the debate.
Rather, the focus is on the decision-making processes of the Community. Maher, supra
note 109, at 237.
111. LAWLOR, supra note 99, at 14. Lawlor suggests that subsidiarity mandates
an anti-legislative and structurally-oriented attitude of the Community toward
consumer issues, an approach that implicitly rejects an active, interventionist
centralized legislative attitude:
There will always be a need for a certain minimum of Community legislation
to define and guarantee basic consumer rights such as physical and economic
safety. Mfore detailed regulations may be needed at other levels, to adapt these
Community-wide requirements to national and local circumstances, but the
policy will achieve its real purpose only when consumers, equipped with a basic
recognition by the law of their proper role in the economy, are enabled to exert
their right of choice to maximum effect. That demands not legislation, but
structures to allow and encourage a flow of information between producer and
consumer, so that the market behaviour of each is based on a full
understanding of the other's needs or capabilities.
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creation of an autonomous consumer policy at the EC level. 112 At the
other extreme, if subsidiarity is interpreted as establishing a
centralizing and federalizing role for EU institutions, an active

autonomous Community-wide policy addressing consumer issues
could be possible, 13 consistent with the enhanced powers granted
to
114
EC institutions under Article 153 of the Treaty of Amsterdam.
Another doctrine, also addressed in Article 5 of the Treaty of
Amsterdam, 115 that restrains Community action vis-a-vis the
Member States is "proportionality." As with subsidiarity, the impact
that proportionality might have as an operative principle is still
largely speculative:
The doctrine of proportionality, which the Court of Justice largely
derived from continental principles of constitutional and administrative
law, is said to require that every Community measure satisfy three
related criteria. First, the measure must bear a reasonable relationship
to the objective - presumably a legitimate one - that the measure is
intended to serve. This may be regarded as the doctrine's "rationality"
component. Second, the costs of the measure must not manifestly
outweigh its benefits. This may in turn be regarded as the doctrine's
"utility" component. Finally, the measure chosen must represent the
solution, among the various alternatives that were available for
achieving the prescribed objective, that is least burdensome. This
requirement to use the "least restrictive" or "least drastic" means is one
that the Court of Justice has typically justified in terms of minimizing
the burdens imposed by the Community on the private sector, but it can
readily be used to minimize the Community's intrusions on the Member
States and their subcommunities as well. Each of the three elements of
proportionality has at least some resonance among levels of judicial
116
scrutiny recognized in U.S. constitutional review.

In the more precise area of consumer law in the European Union,
proportionality suggests that Community-wide measures be based on

a cost-benefit analysis and on developments
market.

117

in the internal

In sum, whether subsidiarity and proportionality will be
interpreted as centralizing or localizing principles remains an open
question.
Legislation at the Member State level might have

advantages such as preserving cultural and legal diversity, which

112.
See HOWELLs & WILHELMSSON, supra note 25, at 302-03 (addressing
arguments against Community involvement based on application of principle of
subsidiarity).
113.
See id. at 303-06 (advancing arguments for future direction of Community
policy and suggesting that principle of subsidiarity will not hinder creation of that

policy).
114.
See supra note 92 (discussing Article 153).
115.
See supra note 101. Along with subsidiarity, proportionality is addressed
by the 1992 PROTOCOL, discussed supra note 104.
116.
Bermann, supra note 103, at 386-87.
117.
See Stuyck, supra note 90, at 398-99 (advancing an approach toward
analyzing proportionality and impact on Community consumer issues).
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could be lost through Community-wide legislation. Community-wide
consumer legislative initiatives, on the other hand, advance with
them important values such as uniformity and certainty. The precise
balance that ultimately will be struck between Member State
autonomy, Community bodies, and the consumer remains an
unfolding issue in the European Union.
D. Conclusion
As the discussion in this section suggests, the questions of
whether and how legally to protect consumers in the market raise a
myriad of complex political and ethical issues. Dissension begins
with the underlying theoretical basis for policing consumer
transactions. That basis may be focused on supporting markets or, at
the other extreme, on intervening into markets based on economic,
ethical, or paternalist rationales. Basic institutional design and
organizational capacity issues may further act to complicate the
initial question concerning values. A traditional framework for legal
analysis seeks merely to evaluate legal products using shared values.
Yet, an institutional framework of analysis provides an alternative to
the traditional approach.
Under this framework, imperfect
information, behavioral realities, and the political and institutional
constraints on legal organizations may influence those organizations
in formulating a legislative response to any consumer protection
issue. Such influences ultimately may act to impact the rules that
emerge from political activity. Under an institutional approach for
analyzing consumer law, background institutional and organizational
factors such as those discussed in this section receive consideration
along with consumer values.
IlI. INSTfUTIONAL INFLUENCES ON CONSUMER LAW

To examine more deeply the impact that values, organizations,
social context, and constraining principles on political actors and
organizations ultimately may have on the final form of substantive
consumer law, Part III compares and contrasts consumer protection
initiatives in the United States and in the European Union. As
mentioned in the previous section, each regime is similar in economic
development, although they have different legal, organizational, and
political histories. Nonetheless, the legal systems also have similaralbeit not identical-federalized structures that work under
analogous constraints allocating power between the local, national,
and supranational levels. In light of such similarities, the traditional
framework would suggest that the two regimes should address
similar issues in a similar manner in areas in which consensus on
consumer ideology exists.
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Yet, the legal treatment of consumer issues such as deceptive
advertising, unfair contract terms, consumer credit issues, and
dispute resolution often differs materially in the two systems, in spite
of these similarities and in spite of shared values. It will be argued
that such differences often do not emerge from serious differences
over consumer values or ideology, but rather from institutional
constraints-including political, social, and cultural constraintsparticular to the systems. For example, the regimes for deceptive
advertising and unfair contract terms reflect more deeply divergent
attitudes toward centralization than toward substantive consumer
social policy." 8 In other words, the differences may emerge if only in
part from institutional or political constraints apart from consumer
ideology. The treatment of consumer credit issues provides an
example of how cultural integration may act to impact the final form,
and ultimate success, of a consumer law." 9 Finally, differing values
toward consumer access to justice issues reflect the effect that
different systems and underlying views toward dispute resolution
120
may have on final legal provisions.
A. Federalizationand Federalism
As discussed in Part II, principles of federalism and subsidiarity
may act to constrain and guide lawmakers' activity. In this section,
two areas of consumer protection law will be discussed: regulating
deceptive advertising and policing unfair contract terms. The
approaches taken by the United States and the European Union in
these areas evidence the impact that federalism values may have on
consumer protection law.
1. Deceptive Advertising
a. United States
Regulation of advertising in the United States begins at the
federal level, which in spite of state and local responses retains the
limelight in the area.
Section 5(a)(1) of the Federal Trade
Commission Act (FTC Act) provides that "[u]nfair methods of
competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in or affecting commerce, are hereby declared unlawful. "12 1

118.
119.
120.
121.

See generally infra Part ILL.A.
See generally infra Part llI.B.
See generallyinfra Part IM.C.
15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1994).
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Dissemination of "any false advertisement" likely to induce the
purchase of food, drugs, devices, or cosmetics is defined under the
FTC Act as an "unfair or deceptive act or practice."1 2 False
advertising, as defined by the FTC Act, is an advertisement that is
misleading in a material respect. m'
The proper standard for assessing the meaning of "deceptive"
and "unfair" has been the subject of the most significant debate in the
area, a debate that focuses principally on a 1983 FTC Policy
Statement. m This Policy Statement articulated in detail the
Commission's current views on the proper standard for deception and
arguably established a more lenient, pro-business standard than that
previously applied.12 The proper interpretation of when an act or

122.
15 U.S.C. § 52.
123.
15 U.S.C. § 55(a)(1).
124.
To read a comprehensive analyses of the pre-1983 and post-1983 situations
regarding the FTC deception standard, and the underlying context and possible impact
of the shift, see Mark E. Budnitz, The FTC's Consumer Protection ProgramDuring the
Miller Years: Lessons for Administrative Agency Structure and Operatwn, 46 CATH. U.
L. REV. 371, 396-409 (1997); Jack E. Karns & Alan C. Roline, The Federal Trade
Commission's Deception Policy in the Next Milenium: Evaluating the Subjective
Impact of Cliffdale Associates, 74 N.D. L. REv. 441 (1998).
125.
A case before the Commission after the 1983 FTC Policy Statement
presented the standard in the following manner, suggesting that it was solely restating
existing FTC jurisprudence:
Mhe Commission will find an act or practice deceptive if, first, there is a
representation, omission, or practice that, second, is likely to mislead
consumers acting reasonably under the circumstances, and third, the
representation, omission, or practice is material. These elements articulate the
factors actually used in most earlier Commission cases identifying whether or
not an act or practice was deceptive, even though the language used in those
cases was often couched in such terms as "a tendency and capacity to deceive."
In the Matter of Cliffdale Associates, 103 F.T.C. 110, 164-65 (1984) (quoting Sears
Roebuck & Co., 95 F.T.C. 406 (1980), affd, 676 F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 1982)). A concurring
and dissenting opinion in Cliffdale Associates, however, accused the majority in the
case of covertly raising the standard for a finding of deception from that previously
applied:
The majority opinion acknowledges that the Commission need not find actual
deception to conclude that Section 5 [of the FTC Act] has been violated.
Furthermore, it admits that the courts have traditionally and recently
recognized this fact by requiring the Commission to find only that an act or
practice has the "tendency or capacity" to mislead consumers. So far, so good.
However, three commissioners have found it necessary to improve on language
long understood by the courts and previous commissioners, by substituting the
word "likely" for "tendency or capacity." "Likely to mislead," they insist,
expresses more clearly the notion that actual deception need not be found!
The avowed intentions of the majority are admirable, but the results of their
effort to "ffix an unbroken legal standard are not. Their choice of language is
unfortunate, because the word "likely" suggests that some particular degree of
likelihood of actual deception must be found. Therefore, it may create the
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practice is "unfair" under the FTC Act is handled by a standard
different from that set forth above for deception and has, along with
deception, been a source of controversy. The vagueness of the
standard made the FTC's unfairness jurisdiction another subject of
maneuvering in the 1980s as the FTC arguably began to adopt a
more pro-industry stance toward advertising regulation. 126 As a
result of this shift in policy, when assessing the "unfairness" of an act
or practice the focus is on actual economic or physical harm caused by
the act. 127 The Commission has now expressly rejected the view that
"unfairness" can be assessed by a standard of "immoral, unethical,
128
oppressive, or unscrupulous" conduct.
Underlying these shifting interpretations of unfairness and
deception under the FTC Act lies a complex and interesting debate on

impression, intentionally or not, that the burden of proof is higher than it has
always been under the traditional "tendency or capacity" standard.
The new deception analysis has a more serious effect that is clearly not
unintentional. That is to withdraw the protection of Section 5 from consumers
who do not act "reasonably."
Id. at 184-85 (Pertschuk, Comm'r, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
126.
See Budnitz, supra note 124, at 409-11 (detailing Congressional efforts to
limit FTC unfairness jurisdiction).
127.
In re Int'l Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. 949 (1984). The test for unfairness was
presented as follows in InternationalHarvester:
The first element . . . is that the injury must be substantial.

Unlike

deception, which focuses on "likely" injury, unfairness cases usually involve
actual and completed harm. While in most cases the harm involved is
monetary, the policy statement expressly noted the "unwarranted health and
safety risks may also support a finding of unfairness."
The second element is that the conduct must be harmful in its net effects.
This is simply a recognition of the fact that most conduct creates a mixture of
both beneficial and adverse consequences. In analyzing an omission this part
of the unfairness analysis requires us to balance [algainst [sic] the risks of
injury the costs of notification and the costs of determining what the prevailing
consumer misconceptions actually are. This inquiry must be made in a level of
detail that deception analysis does not contemplate.
Finally, the third element is that the injury must be one that consumers
could not reasonably have avoided through the exercise of consumer choice.
This restriction is necessary in order to keep the FTC Act focused on the
economic issues that are its proper concern. The Commission does not
ordinarily seek to mandate specific conduct or specific social outcomes, but
rather seeks to ensure simply that markets operate freely, so that consumers
can make their own decisions.
Id. at 1061.
For a discussion of International Harvester, which involved a
manufacturer's failure to warn customers about a dangerous defect in the
manufacturer's product, its relation to earlier FTC unfairness cases, and its
significance in FTC deception cases, see Karns & Roline, supra note 124, at 451-55.
128.
Int'l Harvester, 104 F.T.C. at 1060 & n.42; see also 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (1999)
(1994 amendments tracking FTC Policy Statement and constraining FTC authority in
unfairness cases).
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the proper roles of the federal government versus the states in
regulating deceptive advertising. Over the years, these roles have
shifted from a strongly federal enforcement mechanism under the
FTC Act to a state-dominated one under state law. If only by
perception, prior to the 1980s, when the Reagan era brought
"deregulation" to the fore, the FTC was viewed as adopting a much
more heavy-handed and interventionist approach to consumer
protection issues such as deceptive advertising, a position strongly
opposed by industry. 129 The 1983 Policy Statement thus represented
a move toward federal deregulation. The changes to the federal
standards for deception and unfairness and the development of a
hands-off, pro-industry federal regulatory attitude toward policing
advertising also arguably had the effect of increased state
enforcement of state laws. 3 0 In spite of the historically strong
federal involvement in regulating deceptive advertising, states
themselves nonetheless are active in the area. Every state also
regulates deceptive advertising under what are generally called
unfair and deceptive acts and practices statutes (UDAPS). Many of
these statutes are modeled after the FTC Act itself and, ironically,
were enacted at the urging of a then-activist FTC to facilitate a joint
federal and state effort toward policing deception and unfairness in
consumer transactions. 131 The substance of these statutes varies
widely depending upon the state, 3 2 and state attorney general

129.
See Budnitz, supra note 124, at 371 ("The conventional wisdom is that the
[FTC] under President Carter's Chairman, Michael Pertschuk, turned the FTC into a
renegade agency which engaged in runaway consumer protection, hamstringing
business with excessive regulation to such an extent it became known as the 'national
nanny.").
130.
Report of the American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law Special
Committee to Study the Role of the Federal Trade Commission, 58 ANTITRUST LJ.43,
71-77 (1989) (discussing increase in state policing of advertising due to "the perceived
slackening of FTC enforcement" during Reagan years and approving of increased state
involvement); Ross D. Petty, FTC Advertising Regulation: Survicor or Casualtyof the
Reagan Revolution?, 30 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 33-34 (1992) ("In addition to causing increased
competitor litigation over advertising, the Reagan FTCs perceived advertising
enforcement gap led state attorneys general to begin bringing advertising cases.). The
active and, to a great extent, pro-consumer involvement of the states has not
universally been applauded. See, e.g., Terry Calvani, Advertising Regulation: The
States v. FTC, 58 ANTIMUST L.J. 253, 258-66 (1989) (critiquing perceptions ofa handsoff agenda of the FTC and criticizing state enforcement efforts).
131.
J.R. Franke & D.A. Ballam, New Applications of Consumer Protection Law:
JudicialActivism or Legislative Directive?, 32 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 347, 356-57 (1992)
(discussing the rise of the FTC in the 1960s and enactment of state UDAPS). Unlike
the FTC Act, the state statutes usually provide for a private right of action and
sometimes allow recovery of up to treble damages and of attorney's fees. Id. at 357.
This mechanism allows the consumer to act as a private "attorney general" through use
of the private right of action, thereby enhancing the enforcement effort. Id.
132.
JOHN A. SPANOGLE ET AL., CONSUMER LAW 69-70 (2d ed. 1991); Franke &
Ballam, supra note 131, at 358-60 & nn.71-77 (categorizing general models of state
UDAPS).

1252

VANDERBILTIOURNAL

OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 34:1219

enforcement efforts vary in their positions from either pro-industry to
pro-consumer. 133 It is, however, fair to assert that in response to the
changes in the federal standards in the 1980s, many states have
taken a much more aggressive attitude that favors the consumer, to
134
the chagrin of some pro-industry, pro-deregulation commentators.

Deregulation at the federal level therefore had the effect of steppedup enforcement, if not, in the view of some analysts, over-regulation,
at the state level.
The shifting dialectic between federal and state enforcement
efforts evidences the strongly federalized system for policing
deceptive advertising that has evolved, with the predominant role
being played by the FTC through federal agency action. Subsidiary
to that role, states complement the FTC involvement through their

own analogous statutes that regulate deception. 135 Coordinating and
conflicting efforts will emerge depending on prevalent attitudes
regarding federalism, deregulation, and consumer interests. The

133.
See Calvani, supra note 130, at 266.
134.
See generally id. (critiquing state enforcement efforts); Petty, supra note
130, at 34 (arguing that effect of Reagan era deregulation and heightened state
enforcement efforts caused advertisers "to bear the burden of state regulation and
private litigation costs that are more onerous than prior FTC regulation.").
135.
State UDAPS, while powerful tools for regulating deception, are not the
sole state law mechanism for policing deception. Common law causes of action are
available based upon fraud or misrepresentation, although success using this action
will vary because state attitudes toward actionable fraud differ widely. If the buyer
can prove that the seller made an untrue, fraudulent, or material statement, and that
the buyer reasonably relied upon the statement, an action for misrepresentation
certainly will be successful. E. ALAN FARNsWORTH, CONTRACTS 249-72 (2d ed. 1990).
Beyond liability for intentional misrepresentation, states differ widely as to the buyer's
right to recover using a fraud theory.
For example, Montana broadly defines
constructive fraud as "any breach of duty which, without an actually fraudulent intent,
gains an advantage to the person in fault or anyone claiming under him by misleading
another to his prejudice. . . ." MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-406 (1999). Jurisdictions'
approaches to finding liability for non-disclosure, as opposed to intentional or negligent
disclosure, are even more widely disparate. Cf Ollerman v. O'Rourke Co., 288 N.W.2d
95 (Wis. 1980) (rejecting doctrine of caveat emptor and finding liability for nondisclosure) with Stambovsky v. Ackley, 572 N.Y.S.2d 672 (1991) (limited encroachment
on doctrine of caveat emptor).
The NCCUSL, producers of the Uniform Commercial Code, has attempted to
provide interstate uniformity to the issue by drafting the Uniform Consumer Sales
Practices Act (UCSPA), although this uniform laws effort has been largely
unsuccessful, having been enacted by only two states. The UCSPA provides that "[a]
deceptive act or practice" in connection with a consumer transaction will violate the
UCSPA. See UNIF. CONSUMER SALES PRACTICES ACT § 3, 7A U.L.A. 212 (1999). It also
prohibits "unconscionable" consumer sales practices. Id., § 4(a). When the seller knew
or had reason to know "that he made a misleading statement of opinion on which the
consumer was likely to rely to his detriment," the court should consider that fact as a
circumstance evidencing an unconscionable practice. Id § 4(c)(6). Finally, liability for
breach of express warranty under the UCC may exist as a means of policing deceptive
advertising. See U.C.C. § 2-313, 1A U.L.A. 109 (1999) (providing that when sellers of
goods make an "affirmation of fact" concerning goods that becomes part of the basis of
the bargain, good must conform to that affirmation).

20011

AN INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF CONSUMER LAW

12S3
1

experience post-1983 suggests that efforts at decreased enforcement
at the federal level may in fact result in heightened enforcement
efforts at the state level. Thus, the current regime for policing
deception in the United States operates on a system of dual-tiered
formal enforcement efforts, with a tension arising between federal
and state involvement when differences over values and the proper
scope of intervention occurs.
b. European Union
Some control of advertising occurs through the European Court
of Justice's decisions regarding Member State measures that impact
the functioning of the internal market.1 3 0
Most significantly,
however, the Misleading Advertising Directive (Directive), 137
published in 1984 and amended in 1997, establishes general
principles for advertising regulation in the EU. The Directive begins
by recognizing that "the laws against misleading advertising now in
force in the Member States differ widely" and that "since advertising
reaches beyond the frontiers of individual Member States, it has a
direct effect on the establishment and the functioning of the common
market."138 Under the Directive, Member States are required to
"ensure that adequate and effective means exist for the control of
misleading advertising' 3 9 in the interests of consumers as well as

136.
See, e.g., Verband Sozialer Wettbewerb eV v. Clinique Laboratories SNC &
Estee Lauder Cosmetics GmbH (Case C-315/92), 1994 E.C.R. 1-317 (interpreting EEC

Treaty as precluding national prohibition on products bearing name "Clinique-);
Criminal Proceedings Against Oosthoek's Uitgeversmaatschappij BV (Case 286181),
1982 E.C.R. 4575 (upholding national prohibition on free gift promotional scheme); see
also supranotes 77-81 and accompanying text (regarding the Treaty of Amsterdam free
movement rules and ECJ interpretations thereof).
137.
Council Directive 84/4501EEC of 10 September 1984 Relating to the
Approximation of the Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions of the Member
States Concerning Misleading Advertising (8414501EEC), 1984 O.J. (L250) 17 (amended
by 1997 O.J. (L290) 18, European Parliament and Council Directive 97/55JEC of 6
October 1997 amending Directive 84/450/EEC Concerning Misleading Advertising so as
to include Comparative Advertising). While the Directive prohibits misleading
advertising, it merely regulates comparative advertising. Id. art. 3(a) (setting forth
permissible uses of comparative advertising).
138.
Id. at 17.
139.
The Directive defines "advertising" and "misleading advertising" in the
following manner
1.

'advertising' means the making of a representation in any form in

connection with a trade, business, craft or profession in order to promote the
supply of goods or services, including immovable property, rights and

obligations;
2.

'misleading advertising' means any advertising which in any way,

including its presentation, deceives or is likely to deceive the persons to whom
it is addressed or whom it reaches and which, by reason of its deceptive nature,
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140
competitors and the general public."

is likely to affect their economic behaviour or which, for those reasons, irjures
or is likely to injure a competitor.
Id. art. 2.
140.
Id. art. 4(1). A Television Directive was issued five years after the
Misleading Advertising Directive. Council Directive 89/552/EEC of 3 October 1989 on
the Coordination of Certain Provisions Laid Down by Law, Regulation, or
Administrative Action in Member States Concerning the Pursuit of Television
Broadcasting Activities, 1989 O.J. (L298) 23. The Television Directive governs
numerous aspects of television advertising, including placement and timing of
television advertising, subliminal advertising, surreptitious advertising, cigarette
advertising, alcohol advertising, and children's advertising. See generally id. For
example, the Directive provides that "[tielevision advertising shall not: (a) prejudice
respect for human dignity[] (b) include any discrimination on grounds of race, sex, or
nationality; (c) be offensive to religious or political beliefs; (d) encourage behaviour
prejudicial to health or to safety; [or] (e) encourage behaviour prejudicial to the
protection of the environment." Id. art. 12. Moreover, the Television Directive
continues that
[tielevision advertising shall not cause moral or physical detriment to minors,
and shall therefore comply with the following criteria for their protection:
(a) it shall not directly exhort minors to buy a product or a service by
exploiting their inexperience or credulity;
(b) it shall not directly encourage minors to persuade their parents or others
to purchase the goods or services being advertised;
(c) it shall not exploit the special trust minors place in parents, teachers or
other persons;
(d)

it shall not unreasonably show minors in dangerous situations.

Id. art. 16. Thus, the approach differs from the FTC interpretation of "unfairness" in
significant respects, by suggesting that moral conduct, rather than physical or
economic injury, does constitute a basis for legal intervention.
The problem of comparative advertising in the European Union resulted in the
1997 amendments to the Misleading Advertising Directive to encompass regulation of
comparative advertising. See 1997 Amendments, supra note 137. The amendments
begin by acknowledging that consumer choice is impacted by comparative advertising.
Id. at 18. Comparative advertising is permitted when
(a) it is not misleading,... (b) it compares goods or services meeting the same
needs or intended for the same purpose; (c) it objectively compares one or more
material, relevant, verifiable and representative features of those goods and
services, which may include price; (d) it does not create confusion in the market
place between the advertiser and a competitor or between the advertiser's trade
marks, trade names, other distinguishing marks, goods or services and those of
a competitor; (e) it does not discredit or denigrate the trade marks, trade
names, other distinguishing marks, goods, services, activities, or circumstances
of a competitor; (f) for products with designation of origin, it relates in each case
to products with the same designation; and (g) it does not take unfair
advantage of the reputation of a trade mark, trade name or other
distinguishing marks of a competitor or of the designation of origin of
competing products...
Id. art. 3a.
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These provisions suggest that the Directive is premised on
many14 1 of the same substantive policies and values that justify
intervention in the United States. In contrast to the United States
regime, however, the Directive gives to Member States broad latitude
in determining the means by which to police misleading advertising.
Voluntary control of misleading advertising through industry selfregulation, for example, is permitted, a phenomenon rarely seen in
the United States.142 Member States must ensure that legal or
administrative proceedings are available to check misleading
advertising. 143 The Directive serves to set a regulatory floor for
misleading advertising because Member States are not precluded

"from retaining or adopting provisions with a view to ensuring more
extensive protection ... for consumers, persons carrying on a trade,
business, craft or profession, and the general public." 44
In spite of their reliance upon many shared values regarding the
impact of deception on markets, important structural differences
exist between the U.S. and EU legal regimes. As stated above, the
U.S. enforcement scheme has proceeded within the tensions of state

141.
The EC approach, however, currently places much greater value on
morality in advertising regulation, as reflected most vividly in The Television Directive
discussed supra note 140. This approach contrasts with the FTC views expressed in
International Harvester that "unfairness" under the FTC Act does not encompass
immoral or unethical conduct. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
142.
1984 O.J. (L250) 17, art. 5. Such voluntary proceedings must be in addition
to the court or administrative proceedings otherwise required by the Misleading
Advertising Directive. Id. Self regulation of advertising is not entirely unknown in
the United States. See, e.g., Ross D. Petty, Advertising Law and Social Issues: The
Global Perspective, 17 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 309, 316 (1994) (discussing U.S.
industry self regulation). The American emphasis on placing legal issues within a
framework of regulation versus deregulation, or vice versa, however, allows
intermediate steps such as self regulation to be overlooked as a viable alternative to
either complete regulation or wholesale deregulation. See IAN AntEs & JotaN
BRATrHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION 101-32 (1992) (discussing advantages and
disadvantages of self-regulation).
143.
The Directive provides:
Such means shall include legal provisions under which persons or organizations
regarded under national law as having a legitimate interest in prohibiting
misleading advertising or regulating comparative advertising may.
(a) take legal action against such advertising; andlor
(b) bring such advertising before an administrative authority competent either
to decide on complaints or to initiate appropriate legal proceedings.
It shall be for each Member State to decide which of these facilities shall be
available and whether to enable the courts or administrative authorities to
require prior recourse to other established means of dealing with complaints,
including those referred to in Article 5.
1984 O.J. (L250) 17, art. 4(1) (as amended by 1997 O.J (L290) 18).
144. Id. art. 7(1). The language of Article 7(1), however, does not apply to
comparative advertising "as far as the comparison is concerned." Id. art. 7(2).
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and federal authority and structural values of federalism, and of
regulation versus deregulation. Decreased federal involvement may
act to heighten state efforts as result of these tensions. It is also a
regime that largely downplays self-regulation as a legislative
response to the problem of misleading advertising. In the EU, by
contrast, Member States retain greater power in regulating the issue,
and sometimes radically different state enforcement schemes are
preserved. 145 For example, the U.K. counterparts of the U.S. FTC
Act and the FTC are the Fair Trading Act of 1973 (FTA) and the
Director of Fair Trading. 146 The FTA gives the Director of Fair
Trading authority over "consumer trade practices." 147 In the case of
misleading practices, the Director may use an informal method of
148
Most
dispute resolution to attempt to remedy the procedure.

145.
In Germany for example, competitors and associations have the right to sue
in cases of deceptive advertising, and competitors who unfairly compete must
reimburse claimants for attorneys fees. See Georg Jennes, Germany, in ADVERTISING
LAW IN EUROPE AND NoRTH AMERIcA 151 (James Maxeiner & Peter Schotth6fer eds.,
1992). Contrast such a scheme with the self-regulatory scheme in place in Britain
discussed in the text.
146.
See Fair Trading Act, 1973 (U.K).
147.
Section 13 of the FTA defines "consumer trade practice" as "any practice
which is for the time being carried on in conjunction with the supply of goods (whether
by way of sale or otherwise) to consumers or in connection with the supply of services
for consumers and which relates:
(a) to the terms or conditions (whether as to price or otherwise) on or subject
to which goods or services are or are sought to be supplied, or
(b) to the manner in which those terms or conditions are communicated to
persons to whom goods are or are sought to be supplied or for whom services
are or are sought to be supplied, or
(c) to the promotion (by advertising, labelling or marking of goods,
canvassing, or otherwise) of the supply of goods or of the supply of services, or
(d) to methods of salesmanship employed in dealing with consumers, or
(e) to the way in which goods are packed or otherwise got up for the purpose
of being supplied, or
(0 to methods of demanding or securing payment for goods or services
supplied.
Fair Trading Act 1973, § 13.
148.
The Director's authority stems from the following provisions:
14. - (1) [Subject to the exclusion of certain goods and services, such as legal
and medical services], the Secretary of State or any other Minister or the
Director may refer to the Advisory Committee the question whether a consumer
trade practice specified in the reference adversely affects the economic interests
of consumers in the United Kingdom.
17. - (1)
This section dpplies to any reference made to the Advisory
Committee by the Director under section 14 of this Act which includes
proposals with the following provisions of this section.
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advertising regulation largely occurs at the informal level, however,
because the United Kingdom has significant voluntary controls on
In 1962, the advertising industry created the
advertising.

(2) Where it appears to the Director that a consumer trade practice has the
effect, or is likely to have the effect,-(a) of misleading consumers as to, or withholding from them adequate
information as to, or an adequate record of, their rights and obligations under
relevant consumer transactions, or
(b) of otherwise misleading or confusing consumers with respect to any
matter in connection with relevant consumer transactions, or
(c) of subjecting consumers to undue pressure to enter into relevant
consumer transactions, or
(d) of causing the terms or conditions, on or subject to which consumers enter
into relevant consumer transactions, to be so adverse to them as to be
inequitable.
any reference made by the Director under section 14 of this Act with respect to
that consumer trade practice may, if the Director thinks fit, include proposals
for recommending to the Secretary of State that he should exercise his powers
under the following provisions of this Part of this Act with respect to that
consumer trade practice.
34. - (1) Where it appears to the Director that the person carrying on a
business has in the course of that business persisted in a course of conduct
which(a) is detrimental to the interests of consumers in the United Kingdom,
whether those interests are economic interests or interests in respect of health,
safety or other matters, and
(b) in accordance with the following provisions of this section is to be
regarded as unfair to consumers,
the Director shall use his best efforts by communication with that person or
otherwise, to obtain from him a satisfactory written assurance that he will
refrain from continuing that course of conduct and from carrying on any similar
course of conduct in the course of that business.
35. If, in the circumstances specified in subsection (1) of section 34 of this
Act,(a) the Director is unable to obtain from the person in question such an
assurance as is mentioned in that subsection, or
(b) that person has given such an assurance and it appears to the Director
that he has failed to observe it,
the Director may bring proceedings against him before the Restrictive Practices
Court.
[41.-Allows the Director to bring actions in alternative courts if certain
conditions are met]
Fair Trading Act 1973, §§ 14, 17, 34, 35,41.
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Advertising Standards Authority (ASA), an independent body with
the task of supervising advertising standards-other than on radio
and TV. 149 The Committee of Advertising Practice (CAP) administers
the system along with the ASA and is the body responsible for
producing the British Codes of Advertising and Sales Promotion
(BCASP). 150 In 1999, the United Kingdom adopted a tripartite
system of self-regulation: The independent ASA supervises the
system and applies the BCASP; the advertising industry establishes
the standards in light of all pertinent laws and regulations and
writes the BCASP through the CAP; and the Advertising Standards
Board of Finance (ASBF) provides the framework and funding for the
self-regulatory program. 151
The English case of Director General of Fair Trading v.
Tobyward 52 provides a good illustration of the intersection between

149.
See Darren Fitzgerald, Self-Regulation of Advertising in the United
Kingdom, ENT. L. REV. No. 8(7), at 250-52 (Sweet & Maxwell Ltd. 1997).
150.
See British Codes of Adver. and Sales Promotion §§ 68.12-.22 (10th ed.
1999), available at http'//www.asa.org.uk/the_codes. The CAP currently is comprised of
21 trade and professional groups and associations. Id. § 1 (listing CAP members).
Although the BCASP are quite extensive and deal with standards for many industries,
they also include general principles governing a broad array of issues such as Honesty,
Decency, Truthfulness, Substantiation, Legality, Fear and Distress, Safety, Violence
and anti-social behavior. The following provisions of the BCASP give a sense of the
approach taken by the general principles:
2.1.

All advertisements should be legal, decent, honest and truthful.

2.2 All advertisements should be prepared with a sense of responsibility to
consumers and to society.
2.3 All advertisements should respect the principles of fair competition
generally accepted in business.
2.4

No advertisement should bring advertising into disrepute.

5.1 Advertisements should contain nothing that is likely to cause serious or
widespread offence....
5.2 Advertisements may be distasteful without necessarily conflicting with
5.1 above. Advertisers are urged to consider public sensitivities before using
potentially offensive material.
5.3 The fact that a particular product is offensive to some people is not
sufficient grounds for objecting to an advertisement for it.
6.1 Advertisers should not exploit the credulity, lack of knowledge or
inexperience of consumers.
7.1
No advertisement should mislead by inaccuracy, ambiguity, exaggeration,
omission or otherwise.
Id.
151.
152.

Id. §§ 68.1-68.49.
See Dir. Gen. of Fair Trading v. Tobyward Ltd., 1 W.L.R. 517 (Ch. 1989).
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Community and Member State law and of the impact the British
system of self-regulation has upon deceptive advertising within those
In Tobyward, the manufacturer of a diet
legal frameworks.
product 153 published allegedly misleading advertisements' 54
concerning the product in several newspapers. After receiving a
number of complaints about the advertisements, the ASA contacted
the manufacturer. The council of the ASA upheld the complaints,
and, when the manufacturer continued to publish the
advertisements, the ASA finally referred the matter to the Director of
Fair Trading. 155 After subsequent meetings with the manufacturer,
the Director sought to enjoin the advertisements under the
regulations that implemented the Misleading Advertising Directive
in the United Kingdom.15 6
The court granted the injunction, finding the advertisements to
be prima facie misleading. 157 The court gave broad deference to the
principle of self-regulation embodied in the ASA Code and the British
system of self-regulation. Finding the Director's position on the
advertisement to be "reasonable," the court found that:
[Aldvertisers would be more inclined to accept the rulings of their selfregulatory bodies if it were generally known that in cases in which their
procedures had been exhausted and the advertiser was still publishing
an advertisement which appeared to the court to be prima facie
misleading, an injunction would ordinarily be granted.158

In addition to viewing the court's predominant role as one of
providing force to the system of self-regulation, the court believed the
issuance of the injunction would not interfere with any legitimate
interests of the5 9manufacturer and would protect the consumer
interest as well.'
Tobyward illustrates the very limited intrusion of the
Misleading Advertising Directive into Member State systems, in spite
of the differences existing among the states. The Directive gives

153. The product was a substance called guar gum, which slowed down
elimination of waste, thus making the consumer feel less hungry, and thus arguably
causing the consumer to eat less and lose weight. Id. at 520.
154. The manufacturer claimed that use of the product could result in
permanent weight loss, that there was a "guarantee of success," that the product was a
"new medical breakthrough," that was "100% safe," and that users of the product could
lose specified amounts of weight over a specific time period. Id. at 520.22. Testimony
at trial indicated that these claims were false. Id. at 519-21.
155.
Id. at 520.
156. See Control of Misleading Advertising Regulations 1988, SI 19881915.
157.
The court found that the manufacturer's claims in the advertisements,
discussed supra note 154, were false, and that the advertisements were likely to affect
economic behavior of the persons to whom it was addressed, by making it likely that
they would buy the product. Thus, the ads were "misleading" under the definition
provided by the Directive. Id- at 521-22; see supra note 139 (Directive definition).
158.
Tobyward, 1 W.L.R. at 522.
159. Id.
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much deference to the principle of self-regulation at the very local
level, permitting in the case of the United Kingdom, formal legal
intervention that only arises when all attempts at self-regulation
have failed. This is the case even in the face of claims that selfregulation is anti-consumer. Consumer advocates in the United
Kingdom, for example, have argued against the British method of
self-regulation and the slow enforcement mechanism at the Director
of Fair Trading level. 160 With respect to advertising complaints,
informal resolution through the ASA mechanism makes legal
intervention only a "last resort" and only viable in a small percentage
1 61

of cases.

When comparing the U.S. and EU regimes for policing deceptive
advertising, one can discern principles of federalism and subsidiarity
at work that in themselves create significant differences between the
jurisdictions. In the United States, regulation is focused at the
federal level through enforcement of the FTC Act, with state UDAPS
mirroring, and even supplementing, federal efforts.
Federalism
principles and market regulation concerns act to allocate power
between these bodies. Yet, by framing the debate as "state versus
federal" and "regulation versus deregulation" questions, these
principles and concerns also act to de-emphasize procedures such as
self-regulation as a possible response to the problem. By contrast,
the regime for misleading advertising established in the EU through
the Misleading Advertising Directive is much more sophisticated,
with broad supranational standards that nonetheless leave great
enforcement discretion to Member States and their traditional
systems. Obviously, each system is acting under constraints that are
peculiar to their organizations and legal cultures.
The First
Amendment provides a significant barrier to heavy-handed

160.
See HOWELLS & WEATHERILL, supra note 76, at 511-16 (discussing
complaints against the long processes established under the Fair Trading Act). A 1983
study of 273 merchant assurances obtained pursuant to the Fair Trading Act's
assurances mechanism revealed the following:
-in the case of 100 assurances, the traders subsequently traded satisfactorily;
-in the case of 145 assurances, the traders ceased to trade;
-in the case of 28 assurances, further action was required.
Id. at 512. It could be argued that this data impressionistically suggests that the selfregulation system and the assurances procedures at DFT in the United Kingdom
effectively have acted to check errant traders, either by forcing compliance or by
ejecting marginal traders who engage in deception from the market.
161.
The ASA claims that few advertising cases even require legal intervention
beyond the ASA resolution mechanism.

See ADVERTISING STANDARDS AUTHORITY,

ANN. REP. 1999, availableat http'J/www.asa.org.uk, at 8-11 (Complaint and resolution
figures for 1999). For a recent judicial decision that upholds an ASA adjudication, see
SmithKline Beecham PLC v. Advertising Standards Auth., No. C0/22911200, [20001
EWCA Admin. 6, 2001 WL 14905 (Q.B. 2001).
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regulation of advertising in the United States. 162 Federalization and
federalism are long-established principles in U.S. law, thus making
probable the framing of the debate in terms of federalism. The still
emerging role of EU institutions and concerns over subsidiarity and
proportionality dictate a deferential attitude toward existing Member
State systems by EU bodies.
The situation of a highly federalized, and at times federally
dominated, scheme in the United States and a contrasting decentralized scheme in the EU is not universal in all areas of
consumer protection. As the next section will show, the federalized
U.S. and decentralized EU models reverse in the area of unfair
contract terms.
2. Unfair Contract Terms
Another predominant concern of consumer protection policy
focuses on policing the terms of the consumer contract. Values used
in support of such intervention include fairness issues, market or
information regulation, or concerns over the validity of an agreement
entered into in situations of unequal bargaining power. Under each
view, some sort of legal intervention may be warranted, although in
different degrees depending upon the espoused view. As discussed in
this section, similar to deceptive advertising, federalizing and
decentralizing constraints on lawmakers may affect the ultimate
legal response.
a. United States
In the United States, regulation of terms in the consumer
contract largely occurs at the state level. Two very basic doctrines
affecting use of terms are the obligation of good faith and fair dealing
and the doctrine of unconscionability. The Uniform Commercial Code
provides that "Every contract or duty within this Act imposes an
obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement." 16 Good
faith can mean "honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction
concerned,"164 but more importantly, in the case of a merchant,
means "honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial

162.

See, e.g., Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654 iD.C. Cir.

1995) (en banc) (finding federal restrictions on "broadcast indecency" constitutionally
permissible); Ass'n of Natl Advertisers v. Lungren, 44 F.3d 726 (9th Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 516 U.S. 812 (1995) (upholding California restrictions on environmental claims
in advertising).
163.
U.C.C. § 1-203, 1 U.L.A. 109 (1999).
164. Id. § 1-201(19).
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standards of fair dealing in the trade." 165
Good faith, most
particularly under the latter definition that incorporates notions of
"fair" conduct, can check the use of perceived unfair terms in
consumer contracts. 16 6 The doctrine of unconscionability acts to
regulate terms by giving judges broad latitude to strike out
"unconscionable" terms or to refuse to enforce "unconscionable"
contracts. 167 Also at the state law level, specific types of contract
terms may be heavily regulated. 168 State UDAPS may impact use of
terms in consumer contracts. 169 Finally, individual states may
prohibit particular types of terms-state law usury statutes limiting
maximum interest rates, for example, are a type of legislative
regulation of terms.
As can be seen from these provisions, much of the substantive
regulation of terms in consumer contracts in the United States occurs
at the state law level, often through open-textured standards such as
"good faith," with relatively nominal involvement of the federal
government.
While comprehensive federal statutes governing
disclosure of terms exist-such as the Truth in Lending Act 7 0-their
focus usually is upon disclosure of information and terms rather than
substantive regulation of those terms. 171 Albeit somewhat of a

165.
Id. § 2-103(1)(b); see also id. § 3-103(a)(4) (good faith includes not only
honesty but also observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing).

Article 5 of the U.C.C. (Letters of Credit) incorporates the subjective state of mind
standard. See U.C.C. § 5-102(a)(7), 2B U.L.A. 554 (1999).
166.
See, e.g. id. § 4-401 cmt. 3 (recognizing that good faith may act to limit
bank's discretion in setting fees under bank-depositor contracts).
167.
Section 2-302 of the U.C.C. provides:
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the
contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may
refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract
without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any
unconscionable clause so as to avoid any unconscionable result.
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any clause
thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a reasonable
opportunity to present evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose and effect
to aid the court in making the determination.
U.C.C. § 2-302, 1B U.L.A. 15 (1999).
168.
See, e.g., id. § 2-316 (regulating warranty disclaimers); id. § 2-719(2)-(3)
(restricting limitations of remedies and exclusions of consequential damages).
169.
See supra notes 131-35 and accompanying text.
170.
See infra text accompanying notes 213-19.
171.
This is not to suggest that the federal government is not involved at all in
regulation of terms in consumer contracts. For example, the federal Magnuson-Moss
Warranty Act (MMWA), regulates to a limited degree disclaimers of warranties and
limitations of warranties in written warranties of consumer products. 15 U.S.C. §
2301-12 (1994). Under the MMWA, a designated "Full" warranty may not disclaim or
limit the duration of state law implied warranties. Id. § 104(a). Warranties designated
by the Seller as "Limited" may not disclaim state law implied warranties, but may limit
the duration of such state law warranties if the limitation is conscionable and set forth
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generalization, the area of term regulation in consumer contracts
largely has been the prerogative of the states and the NCCUSL.
Thus, with respect to regulation of contract terms, the situation in
the United States is somewhat a reversal of that seen in the area of
policing deceptive advertising. In the latter area, strong federal
authority historically was exercised through the FTC Act, within an
overarching regime of cooperation and conflict between federal and
state bodies. In the case of contract terms, only limited federal
intervention has occurred to date, with the primary regulatory
17 2
authority retained at the local state level.

b. European Union
As with the United States, the balance of Community versus
Member State authority also shifts in the European Union in the
area of unfair contract terms. One of the EC's more recent Directives
addressed specifically the propriety of including in consumer
contracts many types of unfair contract terms. 173 The Unfair Terms
in Consumer Contracts Directive (UTCC Directive) begins by
recognizing that the disparity among Member State law treatment of
unfair terms may result in distortions of competition between
suppliers"74 and the consumer interests involved in such

in clear and unmistakable language and prominently displayed on the face of the
warranty. Id. § 108. The MMWA thus to some degree preempts state laws that
otherwise would allow disclaimers of warranties in the consumer context. See also 15
U.S.C. § 1639 (1994) (TILA preclusion of types of terms in certain high interest
mortgages).
172.
The sensitivity of federal authorities to the historic role of the states in
contract regulation can be seen most recently in the debates concerning federal
regulation of electronic signatures and the crafting of federal bills around possible state
and NCCUSL actions in the area. See supra note 11.
173.
Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on Unfair Terms in Consumer
Contracts, 1993 O.J. (L95) 29. Some types of terms related to quality of consumer
goods, which have a fairness dimension, are not addressed by the UTCC Directive.
Recently EC bodies promulgated a Directive that addresses the issue of legal and
commercial guarantees in consumer contracts for the sale of goods, analogous to U.C.C.
Article 2 warranty provisions in the United States. Directive 1999/44IEC of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 25 May 1999 on Certain Aspects of the Sale
of Consumer Goods and Associated Guarantees, 1999 O.J. (L171) 12. The Guarantees
Directive provides significant remedies to the consumer when goods do not conform to
express or implied guarantees made by the seller or producer and provides further that
attempts to restrict consumer rights provided by the Directive are not binding on the
consumer. See id. arts. 2, 3, 6 & 7.1. The Directive must be transposed into Member
State law by January 2002. Id. art. 11. As a substantial consumer protection measure,
the Directive has raised significant questions on whether it contravenes the principle of
subsidiarity. See, e.g., Frances E. Zollers, Sandra N. Hurd & Peter Shears, Consumer
Protection in the European Union: An Analysis of the Directive on the Sale of Goods
and Associated Guarantees, 20 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 97, 122-24 (1999) (setting out
parameters of subsidiarity debate).
174. The preamble to the UTCC Directive provides:
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disparities. 175 Under the UTCC Directive, Member States must
provide that "unfair terms" used in a contract concluded with a
consumer 176 by a seller or supplier 17 7 not be binding on the consumer

Whereas the laws of Member States relating to the terms of contract between
the seller of goods or supplier of services, on the one hand, and the consumer of
them, on the other hand, show many disparities, with the result that the
national markets for the sale of goods and services to consumers differ from
each other and that distortions of competition may arise amongst the sellers
and suppliers, notably when they sell and supply in other Member States;

Whereas sellers of goods and suppliers of services will thereby be helped in
their task of selling goods and supplying services, both at home and throughout
the internal market; whereas competition will thus be stimulated, so
contributing to increased choice for Community citizens as consumers;
1993 O.J. (L95) 29. See also Report from the Commission on the Implementation of
Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts,
COM (2000) 248 final, at 13 (noting that competition is distorted by the costexternalizing effects of unfair terms, and that unfair terms lead to distortions in
competition and lower quality prices and services) [hereinafter UTCC Report].
175.
The preamble continues in part:
Whereas, generally speaking, consumers do not know the rules of law which,
in Member States other than their own, govern contracts for the sale of goods
or services; whereas this lack of awareness may deter them from direct
transactions for the purchase of goods or services in another Member State;
Whereas, in order to facilitate the establishment of the internal market and
to safeguard the citizen in his role as consumer when acquiring goods and
services under contracts which are governed by the laws of Member States
other than his own, it is essential to remove unfair terms from those contracts;

Whereas the two Community programmes for a consumer protection and
information policy underlined the importance of safeguarding consumers in the
matter of unfair terms of contract; whereas this protection ought to be provided
by laws and regulations which are either harmonized at Community level or
adopted directly at that level;

Whereas more effective protection of the consumer can be achieved by
adopting uniform rules of law in the matter of unfair terms; whereas those
rules should apply to all contracts concluded between sellers or suppliers and
consumers; whereas as a result inter alia contracts relating to employment,
contracts relating to succession rights, contracts relating to rights under family
law and contracts relating to the incorporation and organization of companies
or partnership agreements must be excluded from this Directive;
1993 O.J. (L95) 29.
176.
A "consumer" is defined as "any natural person who . . . is acting for
purposes which are outside his trade, business or profession." Id. art. 2(b).
177.
A "seller or supplier" is defined as "any natural or legal person who ... is
acting for purposes relating to his trade, business or profession, whether publicly
owned or privately owned." Id. art. 2(c).
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and that the contract continue to bind the parties, if it is capable of
continuing in existence without the unfair terms. 178 Member States
also must ensure that adequate and effective means exist to prevent
the continued use of unfair terms in contracts concluded with
consumers by sellers or suppliers. 179 Terms are "regarded as unfair
if, contrary to the requirement of good faith, [they] cause[ a
significant imbalance in the parties' rights and obligations arising
under the contract, to the detriment of the consumer." 18 °
Terms that have been "individually negotiated" are excepted or
excluded from the general proscription on unfairness. 1 8 ' However, a
term is deemed not to have been individually negotiated "where it
has been drafted in advance and the consumer has therefore not been
able to influence the substance of the term, particularly in the
context of a pre-formulated standard contract."'8 Even if particular
aspects of a term or one specific term have been individually
negotiated, that fact alone does not exclude the application of the
UTCC Directive "if an overall assessment of the contract indicates
that it is nevertheless a pre-formulated standard contract." 183 The
Annex contains an indicative and non-exhaustive list of the terms
that typically might be regarded as unfair18 4 In addition, all terms

178.
179.

Id. art. 6.
Id. art. 7(1). The means are to

include provisions whereby persons or organizations, having a legitimate
interest under national law in protecting consumers, may take action according
to the national law concerned before the courts or before competent

administrative bodies for a decision as to whether contractual terms drawn up
for general use are unfair, so that they can apply appropriate and effective
means to prevent the continued use of such terms.

Id art. 7(2). These remedies "may be directed separately or jointly against a number of
sellers or suppliers from the same economic sector or their associations which use or
recommend the use of the same general contractual terms or similar terms." Id. art.
7(3).
180.
Id. art. 3(1). The unfairness of a term is to be assessed "taking into account
the nature of the goods or services for which the contract was concluded" and reference
is to be made "to all the circumstances attending the conclusion of the contract and to
all the other terms of the contract or of another contract on which it is dependent." Id.
art. 4(1). Unfairness does not relate either to the definition of the main subject matter
of the contract or to the adequacy of the price and remuneration. Id. art. 4(2).
181. Id art. 3(1).
182. Id. art. 3(2). In showing that a standard term has been individually
negotiated, the burden of proof is on the seller or supplier. Id.
183.
See id. The European Commission noted in April 2000 that formal
attempts to invoke the "individually negotiated" term exception are non-existent, but
that the use of boilerplate clauses in computer-generated consumer contracts which
assert that the consumer has individually negotiated the contract is rising, although
such clauses are, in its view, not only null and void, but highly prejudicial to
consumers. UTCC Report, supranote 174, at 14.
184. These terms include those that have the object or effect of:
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(a) excluding or limiting the legal liability of a seller or supplier in the event of
the death of a consumer or personal injury to the latter resulting from an act or
omission of that seller or supplier;
(b) inappropriately excluding or limiting the legal rights of the consumer vis-e-.
vis the seller or supplier or another party in the event of total or partial nonperformance or inadequate performance by the seller or supplier of any of the
contractual obligations, including the option of offsetting a debt owed to the
seller or supplier against any claim which the consumer may have against him;
(c) making an agreement binding on the consumer whereas provision of services
by the seller or supplier is subject to a condition whose realization depends on
his own will alone;
(d) permitting the seller or supplier to retain sums paid by the consumer where
the latter decides not to conclude or perform the contract, without providing for
the consumer to receive compensation of an equivalent amount from the seller
or supplier where the latter is the party cancelling the contract;
(e) requiring any consumer who fails to fulfil his obligation to pay a
disproportionately high sum in compensation;
(f) authorizing the seller or supplier to dissolve the contract on a discretionary
basis where the same facility is not granted to the consumer, or permitting the
seller or supplier to retain the sums paid for services not yet supplied by him
where it is the seller or supplier himself who dissolves the contract;
(g) enabling the seller or supplier to terminate a contract of indeterminate
duration without reasonable notice except where there are serious grounds for
doing so;
(h) automatically extending a contract of fixed duration where the consumer
does not indicate otherwise, when the deadline fixed for the consumer to
express this desire not to extend the contract is unreasonably early;
(i) irrevocably binding the consumer to terms with which he had no real
opportunity of becoming acquainted before the conclusion of the contract;
(j) enabling the seller or supplier to alter the terms of the contract unilaterally
without a valid reason which is specified in the contract;
(k) enabling the seller or supplier to alter unilaterally without a valid reason
any characteristics of the product or service to be provided;
(1) providing for the price of goods to be determined at the time of delivery or
allowing a seller of goods or supplier of services to increase their price without
in both cases giving the consumer the corresponding right to cancel the contract
if the final price is too high in relation to the price agreed when the contract
was concluded;
(m) giving the seller or supplier the right to determine whether the goods or
services supplied are in conformity with the contract, or giving him the
exclusive right to interpret any term of the contract;
(n) limiting the seller's or supplier's obligation to respect commitments
undertaken by his agents or making his commitments subject to compliance
with a particular formality;
(o) obliging the consumer to fulfil all his obligations where the seller or supplier
does not perform his;
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in written contracts must always be drafted in plain, intelligible
language.' 8 5 When there is doubt about the meaning of a term, the
interpretation most favorable to the consumer is to prevail. 18 6
Member States are permitted to adopt or retain the most stringent
provisions compatible with the EC Treaty in the area covered by the
UTCC Directive to ensure a maximum level of protection for the
consumer.1 8 7 Although the UTCC Directive does not take the
extreme measure of adopting a black-list of "unfair" terms, 185 even its
gray-list approach evidenced by the Annex stands to intervene
significantly into Member State law.
While the Misleading
Advertising Directive can be construed as attempting in at least some
degree to preserve Member State regulation and existing systems,
the UTCC Directive might have the opposite effect.
The intersection of British contract law and the Directive
provides a good example of the way in which the UTCC Directive
might fundamentally impact, if not change, the national law of a
Member State within a very short period. The United Kingdom first
implemented the UTCC Directive in 1994.189 The first set of
implementing regulations became effective as of July 1, 1995 and
gave the Director of Fair Trading authority to consider complaints

(p) giving the seller or supplier the possibility of transferring his rights and
obligations under the contract, where this may serve to reduce the guarantees

for the consumer, without the latter's agreement;
(q) excluding or hindering the consumer's right to take legal action or exercise
any other legal remedy, particularly by requiring the consumer to take disputes
exclusively to arbitration not covered by legal provisions, unduly restricting the
evidence available to him or imposing on him a burden of proof which,
according to the applicable law, should lie with another party to the contract.
UTCC Directive, annex. Member States are obligated to transpose the entire text of
the list in the Annex into their respective transposition instrument (the national law
that implements the Directive). See UTCC Report, supra note 174, at 16. The
Commission recently observed two problems stemming from this requirement. First,
Nordic countries have refused to transpose the Annex out of concern that national
courts would use the list instead of applying criterion that under national law offer
more protection for the consumer. See id.; see also Thomas Wilhelmsson, The Unfair
Contract Terms Directive and the Nordic Contract Model, in THE INTEGRATION OF
DIRECTIvE 93/13 INTO THE NATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEMS (Conference Papers 1-3 July
1999) (copy on file with the author) (discussing impact of UTCC Directive on Nordic
countries) [hereinafter 1999 CONFERENCE PAPERS). Second, the vague wording of
subparts to the annex has "%eakened its practical impact" in national court opinions.
UTCC Report, supra note 174, at 16.
185.
UTCC Directive, art. 5.
186.
Id.
187. Id. art. 8.
188.
See UTCC Report, supra note 174, at 16-19 (account of black-list versus
gray-list question in UTCC Directive debate). Many Member States nonetheless have
opted for a black-list approach to the Annex. See id. at 17.
189.
See SI 1994, No. 3159.
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under the regulations. 190 This was replaced by another transposing
instrument five years later.191
Under U.K. domestic law in effect prior to the UTCC Directive,
consumers received substantially less protection than provided under
the Directive. For example, under the Unfair Contract Terms Act
1977, only a limited number of terms were covered as "unfair."192 A
seller could not exclude or restrict his liability for death or personal
injury resulting from negligence. 193 In the case of other loss or
damage, exclusions or restrictions of liability for negligence were to
satisfy a reasonableness requirement. 194 Thus, a greater number of
terms may now be considered perhaps unfair in the United Kingdom
after implementation of the UTCC Directive.
The Directive's incorporation of the obligation of good faith into
consumer contracts also might fundamentally alter U.K. consumer
contract law. The United Kingdom, at least prior to implementation
of the Directive, often took a case-by-case approach to many types of
unfair contract terms, an approach similar to U.S. state contract
law. 95 Often the results were inconsistent. In the 1974 case of
Lloyd's Bank Ltd. v. Bundy, 196 the court adopted a very liberal
approach to policing the consumer contract. Lloyd's Bank involved
an elderly farmer who had mortgaged the family farm to help his
son. 19 7 The banks initiated foreclosure, and the trial court ruled in
favor of the banks, feeling that there was nothing "'which takes this
out of the vast range of commercial transactions." 98 The trial court
ordered the farmer, Herbert Bundy, to give up possession of the farm
to the bank. 199
Bundy appealed on the ground that the
circumstances surrounding the transaction were so exceptional that
20 0
he should not be held bound.

190.
UTCC Report, supra note 174, at 7 n.12; Robert Bradgate, Experience in the
United Kingdom, in 1999 CONFERENCE PAPERS, supra note 184, at 36-37 (laying out
enforcement mechanism established in 1994 Regulations).
191.
Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations, SI 1999, No. 2083 § 2
(revoking SI 1994, No. 3159). The 1994 Regulations were revoked due to their failure
to "fully implement" Article 7(2) by only giving the Director General of Fair Trading the
power to seek injunctions against use of unfair terms. See UTCC Report, supra note
174, at 7. The 1999 Regulations permit several "qualifying bodies," including consumer
associations, also to seek injunctive relief in a representative capacity. See 1999 UTCC
Regulations, § 12, sch. 1.
192.
Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 § 2(1).
193.
Id.
194.
Id. § 2(2).
195.
See supra text accompanying notes 163-72.
196.
Lloyd's Bank Ltd. v. Bundy, 3 W.L.R. 501 (Ct. App. Civ. Div. 1974).
197.
Id. at 504.
198. Id.
199.
Id.
200.
Id.
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The appellate court reversed. While noting that "in the vast
majority of cases a customer who signs a bank guarantee or a charge
cannot get out of it," 20 1 the court then articulated several exceptions
to this rule, all of which were derived from a unifying principle of
inequality of bargaining power.20 2 Yet, the expansive approach of
Lloyd's Bank has not been widely incorporated into English case law.
For example, in Hart v. O'Connor,20 3 the eighty-three year old trustee
of an estate contracted to sell the land to the defendant, a
neighbouring farmer. Unknown to the defendant, the vendor-trustee
was of unsound mind. 2° 4 A brother and his two sons instituted
proceedings in the High Court of New Zealand against the defendant
and the vendor, asserting that the contract should be rescinded for
lack of mental capacity, unfairness, and unconscionability. 20 5 While
the plaintiffs won at the lower court level, the appeal was allowed,
and the court found that the plaintiff did not engage in
unconscionable conduct. 20 6 The court found "no equitable fraud, no
victimisation, no taking advantage, no overreaching or other
description of unconscionable doings" that might justify a finding of
unconscionability. 20 7 Some English commentators also have noted
that English courts generally adopt an extremely conservative
approach to the issues of good faith and unconscionability and
question the implementation of good faith by the UTCC Directive:
The use by [the UTCCO Directive of the notion of good faith raises the
question of whether English Law requires that a party to a contract
exercise his rights in good faith, whether the right in question concerns
the creation of a contract or its performance. Such a question may be
expressed in a variety of ways: put negatively, it may be asked whether
a party's bad faith should affect his exercise of rights or whether his
"unconscionable conduct" in the creation of a contract should affect its
validity and put at its most general, whether this exercise should be

201.

Id. at 506. In the court's view

No bargain will be upset which is the result of the ordinary interplay of forces.
There are many hard cases which are caught by this rule. Take the case of a
poor man who is homeless. He agrees to pay a high rent to a landlord just to
get a roof over his head. The common law vill not interfere. It is left to
Parliament. Next take the case of a borrower in urgent need of money. He
borrows it from the bank at high interest and it is guaranteed by a friend. The
guarantor gives his bond and gets nothing in return. The common law will not
interfere. Parliament has intervened to prevent moneylenders charging
excessive interest. But it has never interfered with banks.
Id.
202. I. at 506-08. The doctrinal categories were delineated "duress of goods",
"unconscionability," "undue influence," "undue pressure," and "salvage agreements."
Id. at 507-08.
203.
Hart v. O'Connor, 3 W.L.R. 214 (Privy Council 1985).
204. Id. at 215.
205. Id.
206. See id. at 233.
207. Id.
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recognised only if this is reasonable or fair. In 1766, in the context of
recognising the duty of disclosure in contract of insurance, Lord
Mansfield C.J. stated that "Itihe governing principle is applicable to all
contracts and dealings. Good faith forbids either party by concealing
what he privately knows, to draw the other into a bargain, from his
ignorance of that fact, and his believing the contrary. But either party
may be innocently silent, as to grounds open to both, to exercise their
judgment upon." Nevertheless, the modern view is that, in keeping
with the doctrines of freedom of contract and the binding force of
contracts, in English contract law good faith is in principle
2 08
irrelevant.

This suggests that the UTCC Directive may significantly impact, or
in fact has already impacted, English law and, most importantly,
aspects of what might be considered very basic contract law policy.
Nor is the impact limited to the United Kingdom, which arguably had
a doctrine of unfairness that acted against the consumer interest that
might justify activist intervention by EU bodies. For example,
contract law in Nordic countries, which emphasizes strongly and
integrally a fairness principle above that established by the UTCC
Directive, also may be impacted adversely by the Directive. 20 9
Such an impact on existing legal traditions among the Member
States suggests an increasingly federalizing and centralizing
approach toward regulating unfair contract terms.
Under the
Directive's approach, existing Member State contract law and
attitudes ultimately may be altered-a position arguably much
different from that suggested by the Misleading Advertising
Directive. Moreover, the conflict between supranational standards

208.
1 CHITTY ON CONTRACTS 1-010, 12-13 (28th ed. 1999); see also MICHAEL H.
WHINCUP, CONTRACT LAw AND PRACTICE 3.25, 56-57 (2d rev. ed. 1992).
[Insofar as English law finds nothing objectionable in contracting to give very
little in order to obtain a great deal, on principle it is not concerned with the
fairness or otherwise of bargains. Its basic attitude is still that of nineteenth
century laissez-faire philosophy. It is a law for merchants and businessmen,
supposedly bargaining on equal terms, each free to get the better of the other if
he can. Once made, the bargain is binding, for better or worse. The law will
not rewrite people's contracts for them in the interests of abstract ideals of
fairness or justice. English law is thus unique in having no general rule
against unconscionable contracts, or in refusing to imply obligations of good
faith between contracting parties.
Id.; Simon Whittaker & Reinhard Zimmermann, Good Faithin European contract law:
surveying the legal landscape, in GOOD FAITH IN EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW 39-48

(Zimmermann & Whittaker eds., 2000) (discussing absence of duty of good faith in
English contract law but noting where good faith principles have been assimilated in
other doctrinal areas). But see Bradgate, supra note 190 (arguing that innovations to
English good faith doctrine following the UTCC Directive are overstated by some
authors).
209. Wilhelmsson, supra note 184, at 20 (discussing potential adverse effect that
UTCC Directive may have on Nordic contract law and theory). For a comprehensive,
comparative treatment of good faith across the Member States in a myriad of areas, see
generally GOOD FAITH IN EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW, supra note 208.
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that strongly favor the consumer interest and local contract policy is
as much a conflict between appropriate views on local versus central
powers as it is one of competing social policy goals or values. For
example, it is hard to reconcile the position taken by the UTCC
Directive with an interpretation of the principle of subsidiarity that
would enhance diversity. 210 The UTCC Directive, in sum, stands as
an example of what may eventually be the "Europeanization" of
Member State private law. 2 11 While in the European Union an
increasing centralizing trend in regulating consumer contract terms
appears to be occurring, the United States to date has resisted this
trend by leaving most of the authority in regulating the terms of the
consumer contract to the individual states and the NCCUSL.
B. Integration. Consumer Credit
As the preceding section suggests, deceptive advertising and
unfair contract terms provide examples of how federalism values may
work into the final form of consumer law. The area of consumer
credit disclosure suggests that cultural, linguistic, and economic
integration also may impact involvement of political organizations in
consumer lawmaking. Compulsory disclosure of information is a
common tool for regulating consumer contracts, implicitly resting on
the rationale that such disclosure may correct informational
imbalances frequently present in consumer contracts. 212 As will be
discussed in this section, the experience in the European Union

210.
See supra text accompanying notes 99-114. In a recent article Gunther
Teubner argues that the interjection of good faith into British law by the UTCC
Directive should be interpreted as an "irritant" that will provoke a uniquely British
reconstruction of the doctrine rather than as a "transplant" of foreign legal doctrine
into the domestic British system. See generally Gunther Teubner, Legal Irritants:
Good Faithin BritishLaw or How Unifying Law Ends Up inNew Divergences, 61 MOD.
L. REV. 11 (1998). Positing that national legal systems operating within different
production regimes inevitably will devisesdifferent doctrinal solutions to the same
problems, Teubner argues against a unifying interpretation of EU harmonization in
favor of a diversification approach. See id. at 31-32.
211.
See Stuyck, supra note 90, at 396-97 (discussing current perspectives on
"creeping Europeanization" and its impact on private law); see also Editorial.
Europeanizationof private law-Part2, 35 COMNZON MKT. L. REV. 1013 (1998) (quoted
in id. and raising concern over centralization reflected in consumer-related areas).
Whether a "European consumer law" exists or should exist perhaps depends on what
that term is intended to define. See Thomas Wilhelmsson, Is There a European
Consumer Law - and Should There Be One?, 41 SAGGI, CONFEREN E E SFINuM 1.3
(Centro di Studi e Recerche Di Diritto Comparato 2001) (distinguishing different
meanings attributed to "European consumer law" and arguing against development of
such a law that connotes changes at the deeper level of legal culture); see also Teubner,
supra note 210, at 12-13, 31-32 (suggesting that Europeanization, interpreted as
unification through law, inevitably produces new divergences and supporting
interpretation that favors devolution and diversification).
212.
See generally William C. Whitford, The Functions of Disclosure Regulation
in Consumer Transactions,1973 WIS.L. REV. 400.
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suggests that a disclosure initiative requires a sufficient degree of
common community values and integration of legal and economic
cultures as a condition to successful implementation. Although
mandated disclosure has been a successful federal legislative
technique in the United States, where the individual states have
relatively homogenous cultural and economic values, and a common
language as well, similar disclosure initiatives in the European
Union have been less successful.
1. United States
The archetype of all modern consumer disclosure statutes is
2 13
perhaps the United States federal Truth in Lending Act (TILA),
which among other things requires creditors to disclose clearly and
conspicuously the "annual percentage rate" and "finance charge" in
consumer credit transactions. 14 Regulation Z,215 promulgated by the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, implements TILA. From
a technical standpoint, perhaps the most significant problem with
consumer credit disclosure is developing a common working
definition of "finance charge" and "annual percentage rate." In the
United States, the issue of whether the cost of credit-the finance
charge-includes points, loan fees, credit, or other insurance is an
issue that results in significant TILA questions. Similarly, quoted
rates of interest may vary widely depending on the method used to
calculate annual percentage rate (APR).
Detailed regulations
promulgated under TILA attempt to resolve these problems.2 16
While it is a target of criticism for its underlying rationales or for
its failed methodology 217 and is widely excoriated by the financial
community, 218 TILA nonetheless can be considered a successful

213.
15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667f(1995).
214.
Id.
215.
12 C.F.R. pt. 226 (2001).
216.
See id. §§ 226.4, 226.14; see also Edward L. Rubin, Legislative Methodology:
Some Lessons from the Truth-in-Lending Act, 80 GEO. L.J. 233, 277-80 (discussing
original debates regarding computation of cost of credit and APR).
217.
See generally Rubin, supra note 216 (critiquing TILA and arguing that
TILA represents a failure of legislative methodology). As Professor Rubin points out,
the efforts of the Federal Reserve in implementing TILA through Reg Z played a
significant role throughout the history of TILA. See id. at 289-95.
218.
TILA is a perennial contender for financial institutions' least favored
statute, on the grounds that it creates costly paperwork and exposes them to
unjustified lawsuits. See, e.g., Dean Anason, Lender Groups Call For Overhaul of
Respa, Truth-in-Lending Act, AM. BANKER, Feb. 21, 1997, at 2. According to one
industry representative, the TILA requirements are "excessive, confusing, and difficult
to comply with." Id. Research by government regulators suggests that TILA is one of
the most commonly violated consumer protection laws, although most violations are
not of an egregious nature. See Dean Anason, In Focus: FDIC: Most Banks Break
Consumer Laws, And Mostly by Mistake, AM. BANKER, Sept. 15, 1997, at 3. In 1996, for
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disclosure act when measured by its staying power alone.
Differences, often harsh, most often arise concerning the proper
interpretation of the statute and also its underlying effectiveness. 2 19
It is difficult, however, to argue in favor of repealing "truth." While
to its critics inadvisable or ineffectual, consumer credit disclosure not
only was possible legislatively in the United States, but has proven to
be a consumer protection device of lasting duration.
2. European Union
Some attempts to regulate disclosure of the cost of consumer
credit have occurred at the EC level. Unlike in the United States,
however, these attempts have been modest and, to date, successful
only in incremental degrees and with nominal actual impact. In
1987, a Council Directive first addressed consumer credit disclosure
issues.22 0 Similar to TILA, this Directive, to a limited extent,
attempted to impose mandatory disclosure to consumers of interest
rates. The Directive required that all credit agreements be in writing
and that the consumer receive a copy of the written agreement. 22 1
The written agreement was to include a statement of the annual
percentage rate of charge,= a statement of the conditions under
which the annual percentage rate of charge may be amended, and the
other essential terms of the contract.2 3

example, the FDIC forced 148 banks to compensate 6272 customers $1.4 milhon for

TILA violations. I&
219.
See, e.g., Rubin, supra note 216, at 236 & nn.14-15 (results of leading
empirical studies of THA); 298-99 (discussing alternatives to disclosure as a means of
policing abusive credit).
220.
Consumer Credit Directive 87/102/EEC (Dec. 22, 1986) (amended by
Council Directive 90/8!EEC, 1990 O.J. (L 061) 14-18 and by European Parliament and
Council Directive 9817/EEC, 1998 O.J. (L 101) 17-23).
221.
Id art. 4(1). A "credit agreement" meant "an agreement whereby a creditor

grants or promises to grant to a consumer a credit in the form of a deferred payment, a
loan or other similar financial accommodation." Id. art. 1(2)(c).
222. Prior to the 1998 amendments, "Annual percentage rate of charge" meant
"the total cost of the credit to the consumer" expressed as an annual percentage of the

amount of the credit granted and calculated according to existing methods of the
Member States. Id. art. 1(2)(e). "Total cost of the credit to the consumer," used to
calculate the annual percentage rate of charge was defined as "all the costs ofthe credit
including interest and other charges directly connected with the credit agreement,"
again to be determined in accordance with the provisions or practices of the Member
States. Id. art. 1(2)(d). In cases where it was not possible to state the annual
percentage rate of charge, the consumer was to have been provided with "adequate
information" in the written agreement. Id. art. 4(2).
223. Id. art. 4(2). In the case of agreements for financing goods or services
contracts, "essential terms" could include the following(i) a description of the goods or services covered by the agreement; (ii) the cash
price and the price payable under the credit agreement; (iii) the amount of the
deposit, if any, the number and amount of instalments and the dates on which
they fall due, or the method of ascertaining any of the same if unknovn at the
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Yet, due to the lack of a shared Community method for
calculating annual percentage rate, an issue long resolved in the
United States through TILA and through federal regulatory
involvement, the 1987 Directive could only defer to Member State
methods for calculating APR. 224 Significant amendments attempting

to address these problems related to lack of a common method for
calculating APR followed later.22 5 In 1990, the Consumer Credit
Directive was amended to provide a uniform method for calculating
consumer credit costs and APR throughout the European Union, to be
phased over a three-year period. 22 6 Yet, this amended Directive has
22 7
had only limited success, with delays occurring in implementation.
Another amendment to the Consumer Credit Directive, this time to
modify the uniform method and thus to establish a common
Community APR and to create an EU symbol to indicate that APR,
followed in 1998.228 Well into the second decade of initiatives to
harmonize consumer credit disclosure rules in the European Union,
progress on the matter has been limited.
Raw interest group politics and Member State interests 229

admittedly may play a role in the slow development of a Communitywide APR standard. In addition to those factors, the limited success
and frequent delays in implementation of a common method of
interest rate disclosure suggests also that limited integration of
credit markets among the Member States of the European Union may
impact

the

development

of

consumer

law. 230

Significant

discrepancies in business practices, Member State legislation, and
tax issues provide additional hurdles along with credit market

time the agreement is concluded; (iv) an indication that the consumer will be
entitled . . . to a reduction if he repays early; (v) who owns the goods (if
ownership does not pass immediately to the consumer) and the terms on which
the consumer becomes the owner of them; (vi) a description of the security
required, if any; (vii) the cooling-off period, if any; (viii) an indication of the
insurance (s) required, if any, and, when the choice of insurer is not left to the
consumer, an indication of the cost thereof.
Id. annex.
224. See supra text accompanying notes 214-16; see also HOWELLS &
WILHELMSSON, supra note 25, at 204.
225.
See HOWELLS & WILHELMSSON, supra note 25, at 194-95 (discussing
development of EC proposals on consumer credit).
226.
Council Directive 90/88/EEC, 22 February 1990 amending Directivo
871102/EC for the Approximation of the Law, Regulations, and Administrative
Provisions of the Member States Concerning Consumer Credit, 1990 O.J. (L 061) 14-18.
227. See HOWELLS & WILHELMSSON, supra note 25, at 205-06; 1997 O.J. C 155
(Mar. 11, 1997) 1.
228.
European Parliament and Council Directive 98/7/EC, preamble, 1998 O.J.
(L 101) 17-23 (mandating use of Community-wide APR standard).
229.
For example, a common formula would result in the changing of practices in
France and Germany. See HOWELLS & WILHELAISSON, supra note 25, at 205.
230. See 1997 O.J. C 115 (Mar. 11, 1997) 2.
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development.2 3 1 The limited volume of cross-border transactions to
date, in which a common method of computing interest rates would
prove most useful, also has weighed against success.0 2 Coupled with
slow market integration are political considerations weighing against
success. EC imposition of a Community-wide disclosure method
might act to test the boundaries of subsidiarity and
proportionality. 33 Finally, because disclosure of information invokes
with it language issues, cultural concerns related to language
preservation may also be related to the slow progress of consumer
credit disclosure in the European Union.2
Factors such as these, which are acting to check successful EU
level disclosure initiatives, illuminate some crucial antecedents for
successful harmonization. The history of consumer credit disclosure
initiatives provides an example of how legal, business, and social
culture can impact the form and success of consumer law at the
national or transnational level. As the EU experience demonstrates,
a sufficient amount of legal, cultural, and economic integration must
exist prior to creation of largely uniform, and successful, disclosure
standards across borders.
The limited success of credit disclosure in the European Union
also, through implication, demonstrates some factors that advanced
TILA's success in the United States. Returning again to the United
States experience with TILA, and contrasting the success of TILA
with the EU experience, it is likely that many factors apart from
consumer politics and consumer ideology contributed to the success of
TILA. TILA was enacted at a time when the states had attained a
sufficient amount of economic and legal integration to make TILA a
political possibility at the federal level. The preference for federal
over state action during the time of enactment made congressional
action politically palatable, if not self-evidently proper, under thenprevalent views on appropriate federal action. Most critically, the
existence of an established regulatory body such as the Federal

231.
232.

See id. 2.3.
See id 2.4.

[Clonsumer credit is still largely provided by the financial institutions of a
country for the residents of the same country, and for obvious reasons: the need
to know the client, different legislation, difficulty in reclaiming sums lent
abroad. It is only in certain border areas that cross-border credit is of any
significance.

Id.
233. See id. ("The Commission has accepted that it is not possible, while
complying with the proportionality rule and subsidiarity, to harmonize these
definitions.").
234.
Cf Michele Belluzzi, Cultural Protection as a Rationale For Legislation:
The French Language Law of 1994 and the European Trend Toward Integration in the

Face of Increasing U.S. Influence, 14 DICK. J. INT'L L. 127 (1995) (discussing cultural
dimension of language restrictions at Member State level).
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Reserve that had both the expertise and desire to enforce TILA after
its enactment ensured the "success" of the law. Focusing the debate
exclusively on whether federal action through TILA was wise or
improper, as traditional legal analysis might suggest, thus would
overlook the political, organizational, cultural, and economic
factors-such as economic and legal integration, developed political
bodies, common language, and federalism values-that were present
at the time of enactment so as to permit legislative action. And, the
experience of credit disclosure comparatively indicates that these
factors are not insignificant aspects in the development of disclosure
laws.
C. Systems: ConsumerArbitration
The question of creating just and accessible systems for resolving
consumer disputes plays an important role in consumer protection.
To paraphrase the old saying, rights must have remedies. A great
number of consumer dispute mechanisms exist, which vary from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction. For example, both the United States and
Europe rely significantly on consumer complaint mechanisms as an
informal means of enforcing consumer disputes. The Better Business
Bureau in the United States is an example of this method of dispute
resolution. Member States of the European Union have similar
entities to assist consumers, such as, in the United Kingdom,
organizations including Consumer Advise Centres, Citizens' Advice
Bureaus, and trade associations. 235 The EC has begun to work on the
transnational level to provide methods of informal dispute resolution
by establishing a pilot project that has opened "frontier centres" in
European cities to provide information on consumer issues and
consumer law. 236

The centers are run by private or public sector

agencies experienced in consumer affairs and are assisted by the
237
Commission.
Beyond the purely informal methods of dispute resolution exists
a myriad of enforcement schemes that fall short of traditional judicial
dispute resolution. The British Code of Advertising Practice provides
a good example of industry self-regulation, an approach less favored
in the United States, which usually emphasizes dispute resolution
within more formal legal structures. 238 The U.S. FTC Act 239 and the

U.K. Fair Trading Act 2 40 are examples of employing agencies to

235.

See RAMSAY, supra note 24, at 126.

236.

COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, CONSUMER POLICY: SECOND

COMMISSION THREE-YEAR ACTION PLAN 19 (1993).
237.
Id.
238.
See supra notes 149-62 and accompanying text.
239.
See supra text accompanying notes 121-28.
240.
See supra notes 146-48 and accompanying text.
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enforce consumer rights, with the primary agency remedy being the
injunction or cease and desist order. 241 In the arena of formal judicial
dispute resolution, many procedural devices are used to secure
consumer access to justice. In the United States, the predominant
scheme is to allow private rights of action. For example, many state
deceptive practices statutes employ consumers as private attorneys
general by allowing consumers to bring a private action under the
statute. - Burdens of proof, provisions for statutory damages and for
punitive damages, authorization for class actions, and awarding of
attorneys fees are all additional devices that are intended to provide
consumers with greater access to the courts in the United States.
Class actions, nonetheless, are a U.S. phenomenon and an approach
rarely available in the European Union, although the 1998 Directive
on injunctions in the consumer context has brought a somewhat
similar device by allowing specified national bodies to bring actions
for injunctions in other Member States to protect the "collective
interest of consumers" in the enjoining jurisdiction. 243 Punitive
damages rarely are recoverable in the European Union unless
expressly authorized by statute, and no statutes presently in force
provide for such damages.Y
Such wide variety of types of informal and formal devices for
dispute resolution and differing attitudes toward implementation of
those devices to enhance consumer access to justice vill act to cause
significant variations in legislation among states or countries. The
question of enforceability of arbitration clauses in consumer
contracts, perhaps one of the most important issues concerning access
to justice today, provides a good example of the serious differences
that can emerge due to differing attitudes and values toward dispute
resolution systems. The legal response to the enforceability of such
clauses diverges between the United States and European Union.
Each jurisdiction begins at the same factual point-arbitration
increasingly is becoming a key mechanism for consumer dispute
resolution in both the United States and the European Union and
contractual waivers of a judicial forum in consumer transactions are
Yet, beyond that, significant differences arise when
frequent.

241.

See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 57(b) (FTC Act cease and desist order); see ak.o supra

note 148 (Director of Fair Trading powers).
242.

See supranote 131.

243.

Council Directive 98/27/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council

of 19 May 1998 on injunctions for the protection of consumers' interests, art. 1, 1993
O.J. (L 166) 51, 52; see also West & Rose, supra note 71, § 10.3 (discussing attitude
toward class actions in EU); David J. Schwartz, Note, Loose Teeth in European Union
Consumer ProtectionPolicy. The Injunction Directive and the Mass Default Scenario,
28 GA. J. INT'L & COMI. L. 527, 537-38 (2000) (discussing limited effectiveness of
Injunction Directive's group action provisions in accommodating absence of class action
in Europe).
244.
West & Rose, supra note 71, § 10.2.
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addressing the legal response to this reality. In the United States,
the propriety of enforcing arbitration clauses in consumer contracts
has become one of the most hotly contested areas of consumer law
and evokes with it basic conceptual issues about both contract law
and federalism. The subject has been the focus of extensive scholarly
debate. 245 In the United States Supreme Court case of Allied-Bruce
Terminix Cos. & Terminix International Co. v. Dobson,240 the
contract law and institutional issues were conjoined. The Terminix
case involved the enforceability of an arbitration clause in a termite
protection plan originally entered into between a franchisee of the
companies and the seller of the plaintiffs house in Alabama. The
contract had been transferred to the plaintiff after he and his wife
purchased the owner's house. 247 Although the franchisee upon the
sale re-inspected the house and found it free of termites, a termite
infestation was discovered almost immediately after the sale.2 48 The
franchisee made efforts to treat and repair the house, but the
plaintiff found the efforts unsatisfactory and sued the franchisee and
franchisors in Alabama state court. 249
The defendants asked for the state court to stay the matter
because the contract contained an arbitration clause providing that
any controversy or claims arising out of or relating to the agreement
were to be settled exclusively by arbitration. 250 Under Alabama law,
however, pre-dispute arbitration agreements were invalid and
unenforceable. 25 1 The trial court therefore denied the motion for a
stay, and on appeal the Alabama Supreme Court upheld the
denial. 252 Although the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) provides that
a "written provision in . . . a contract evidencing a transaction
involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter
arising out of such contract . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and

245.
See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contractand Jurisdiction,
1996 Sup. CT. REV. 331 (1996) (critiquing Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding
arbitration); Richard E. Speidel, Consumer Arbitration of Statutory Claims: Has PreDispute [Mandatory]Arbitration Outlived Its Welcome?, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1069 (1998)
(summarizing views on fairness concerns regarding arbitration); Stephan J. Ware,
Consumer Arbitration As Exceptional Consumer Law (With A ContractualistReply to
Carrington & Haagen), 29 McGEORGE L. REV. 195 (1998) [hereinafter Consumer
Arbitration] (exploring contract law dimension of enforcement of arbitration clauses);
Stephan J. Ware, Arbitration and Unconscionability After Doctor's Associates, Inc. v.
Casarotto, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1001 (1996) [hereinafter Unconscionabilityl
(discussing the use of unconscionability doctrine).
246.
Terminix Int'l Co. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995).
247.
Id. at 268.
248.
Id.
249.
Id. at 268-69.
250.
Id. at 268.
251.
ALA. CODE § 8-1-41(3) (1993). Alabama is one of a small number of states
refusing to enforce pre-dispute arbitration agreements.
252.
Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 628 So.2d 354 (Ala. 1993).
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enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for
the revocation of any contract,"25 3 the Alabama Supreme Court found
the FAA inapplicable.254 The state court first interpreted the FAA's
language of "evidencing a transaction involving commerce" as
requiring that the parties at the time of entering into the contract
"contemplated substantial interstate activity."2 5 Finding that the
parties in the dispute-a local franchisee and a home purchasercontemplated a primarily local transaction, the court refused to
enforce the arbitration clause, as required by Alabama state law. 25 6
The United States Supreme Court reversed the denial of the
stay. It rejected the "contemplation of the parties" test applied by the
Alabama Supreme Court and several other courts 257 to determine
whether the FAA applied and held that the FAA applied whenever
there was interstate "commerce in fact," irrespective of the
Because there was no
reasonable expectations of the parties. 258
commerce in fact, the
interstate
contract
involved
that
the
dispute
clause
applied irrespective
the
arbitration
FAA's broad validation of
259
In response to arguments
of the state policy against enforcement.
acted
against the interests of
that the "commerce in fact" rule
consumers, the Court appeared to take the position that arbitration is
often in the interest of individuals.2 60 While the Court indicated that
states have some freedom to regulate individual arbitration clauses,
such regulatory means appear to be limited only to employment of
treat arbitration clauses
"general contract law principles" that do not
26
less favorably than any other sort of term. '
Yet, "general contract law principles" provide a limited arsenal
for consumer lawyers seeking to invalidate arbitration clauses in
consumer contracts, most particularly in light of the Court's
expansive reading of the FAA in other areas. A requirement that an
arbitration clause be prominently displayed in a consumer contract
most likely might be found to be inconsistent with the FAA.2 62 That

253.

9 U.S.C. § 2 (1998).

254.
255.

Allied-Bruce Terminix, 628 So.2d at 355.
Id.

256. Id at 351.
257. See, e.g., Lacheney v. Profitkey Int'l, Inc., 818 F. Supp. 922 (E.D. Va. 1993);
Burke County Public Schools Bd. of Educ. v. Shaver P'ship, 279 S.E.2d 816 (N.C. 1981);
R.J. Palmer Constr. Co. v. Wichita Band Instrument Co., 642 P.2d 127 (Kan. Ct. App.

1982).
513 U.S. at 278-80.
258.
259. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 278-80 (1995).
260. Id. at 280-81 ("Indeed arbitration's advantages often would seem helpful to
individuals, say, complaining about a product, who need a less expensive alternative to
litigation").
261. Id. at 281.
262.

Cf Doctors Assocs.,

Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 686-88 (1996)

(invalidating state law that required first-page prominent notice of arbitration clause).
Doctors Associates was limited to state statutes requiring prominent notice, but the
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the clause has not been brought to the consumer's attention could be
64
largely irrelevant.2 63 In the notable case of Hill v. Gateway 2000,2

the court found enforceable an arbitration clause included in a list of
terms shipped in the box along with the goods. The manufacturer
employed an "accept-or-return" policy under which the list of terms
would be deemed to have become part of the contract unless the goods
were returned within thirty days.26 5 The court found such a practice

binding on the consumer. 266 In response to arguments concerning the
unfairness of arbitration to consumers, the court merely stated that
was an issue "for Congress and the contracting parties to
267
consider."
The patent hostility to consumer access to courts in the United
States through judicial enforcement of arbitration clauses is by no
means universal. Applying general contract principles, courts have
refused to enforce arbitration clauses because of lack of mutuality of
2 69
consent 268 or by applying the doctrine of unconscionability.
Enforcement also has been denied where enforcement of an
arbitration agreement would create a barrier to the consumer's
270
effective exercise of rights created under other consumer statutes.
Such activist courts, however, appear to be the exception rather than
representative

of a pro-consumer

trend in the courts. 271 The

Court implied strongly that common-law requirements also would run afoul of the FAA.
See id. at 687 n.3.
263.
Cf Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 596-97 (1991)
(enforcing forum selection clause).
264.
Hill v. Gateway 2000, 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S.
808 (1997).
265.
Id. at 1148.
266.
Id. at 1150.
267.
Id. at 1151.
268.
See Knepp v. Credit Acceptance Corp., 229 B.R. 821, 836-37 (Bankr. N.D.
Ala. 1999) (finding no enforceable agreement to arbitrate due to lack of mutuality of
consent).
269. See, e.g., id. at 837-38 (invalidating arbitration clause under
unconscionability doctrine); see also, e.g., Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare
Servs., Inc., 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 745, 768-73 (2000) (invalidating one-sided arbitration
clause as unconscionable absent valid business justification for one-sided nature); see
also Ware, Unconscionability, supra note 245 (comprehensive discussion of use of
doctrine of unconscionability in light of Supreme Court's views on FAA).
270. See Randolph v. Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala., 178 F.3d 1149, 1151 (1lth Cir.
1999) (refusing to enforce arbitration of TILA claims); Shankle v. B-G Maintenance
Management of Colo., Inc., 163 F.3d 1230, 1235 (10th Cir. 1999) (finding arbitration
created unacceptable barrier to access to judicial forum); Broughton v. Cigna
Healthplans of California, 988 P.2d 67, 71 (Cal. 1999) (finding claim that seeks
injunctive relief under state UDAP statute to be inarbitrable).
271. See, e.g., Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 82 (2000)
(Supreme Court reversal of lower court finding of unenforceability due to insufficient
record regarding prohibitive cost of arbitration); Harris v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 183 F.
3d 173, 180-81 (3d Cir. 1999) (rejecting consumer's lack of mutuality argument); In re
Pate, 198 B.R. 841, 844-45 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1996) (same); see also Ware,
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vehemently pro-FAA case law from the Supreme Court, when coupled
with judicial interpretations of state contract law regarding
fundamental fairness and consent that often disfavor the consumer,
has resulted in a strong-if not in some courts nearly irrebuttablepresumption that favors enforcement of arbitration clauses in
consumer contracts.
While the issue of arbitration of consumer disputes in the United
States is being addressed via the judiciary and rests facially upon
doctrines of federalism and freedom of contract, in Europe a

somewhat opposite attitude toward enforcement of mandatory
arbitration clauses in standard form consumer contracts is emerging.
Consumer arbitration clauses are gray-listed under the UTCC
Directive discussed earlier.272
While this EC action does not
necessarily act to invalidate all mandatory arbitration clauses,
because those terms only "may" be considered unfair under the
Directive, the gray-listing is significant. Appearance on the Annex
suggests a reversal of the presumption, implicit and virtually
irrebutable in U.S. case law, to the effect that arbitration acts in the
interests of consumers. 273
Thus, the two jurisdictions, while

Unconscionability, supra note 245, at 1017 n. 108 (discussing views on likelihood of
using unconscionability successfully to deny enforcement to arbitration agreements).
272.
See supra text accompanying notes 173-88. Paragraph (q) of the Annex to
the UTCC directive provides that the following types of clauses may be considered
unfair.
(q) excluding or hindering the consumer's right to take legal action or exercise
any other legal remedy, particularly by requiring the consumer to take disputes
exclusively to arbitration not covered by legal provisions, unduly restricting the
evidence available to him or imposing on him a burden of proof which,
according to the applicable law, should lie with another party to the contract.
Council Directive 93/13/EEC (5 April 1993), Annex, q (q). While mandatory arbitration
is disfavored, voluntary extra-judicial settlement of consumer disputes is not viewed as
inherently against the consumer interest. See, e.g., Council Resolution of 25 May 2000
on a Community-wide network of national bodies for the extra-judicial settlement of
consumer disputes, O.J. 2000 C155/1, S 4 (listing voluntary participation and other
criteria that initiatives towards extra-judicial resolution should meet).
273.
Substantial case law already has emerged regarding treatment of standard
arbitration clauses and other related access to justice types of clauses under the UTCC
Directive. See UTCC Report, supra note 174, at 44, 52 (reporting over six hundred
cases in UTCC database concerning paragraph Q of Annex). The concern over
mandatory arbitration of consumer disputes in the EU often lies in the presumed
unfairness that occurs because of the exclusion or hindrance of the right to take legal
action or seek a legal remedy. See id- at 44; Bradgate, supra note 190, at 32 (noting
that mandatory arbitration clauses in U.K. consumer contracts are now presumptively
unfair when disputed amounts are less than £3000); William W. Park, Bridging the
Gap in Forum Selection: HarmonizingArbitration and Court Selcction. 8 TRAS,;AT'L
L. & CONTEMP. PROBs. 19, 39-40 (1998) (noting EC and Member State legal trends
protecting consumers from pre- and post-dispute arbitration agreements and pointing
out that the "United States lags behind."). Moreover, some evidence suggests that
certain other types of informal dispute resolution systems fail to accommodate the
consumer interest. While the EC's Economic and Social Committee has criticized
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beginning from the same point that recognizes that arbitration is
used as a consumer dispute mechanism, immediately diverge into
different perspectives on the propriety of that mechanism.
These differences, moreover, exist despite the fact that the EU
and U.S. approaches toward arbitration reflect similar federalizing
notions.
In each case, intervention through federal bodies is
preferred over state action or policy, such as the strongly antiarbitration policy of Alabama. While a pro-consumer anti-arbitration
policy has been achieved through active Community-wide
intervention in the European Union, such a policy has been unable
effectively to be brought about in the United States. Thus, while the
jurisdictions demonstrate analogous federalizing trends, they come
out largely on different sides on the issue of the propriety of
consumer arbitration.
Finally, the UTCC Directive differs significantly from the United
States regarding basic contract law policy. By gray-listing terms in
the consumer contract through the UTCC Directive, the European
Union moves toward an anti-contract approach to consumer
arbitration, in which consent plays less of a role in determining
whether a term ought to be enforced. This approach stands in
opposition to the current U.S. approach, which emphasizes contract
2 74
and consent as primary issues, be that emphasis right or wrong.
The experience with consumer arbitration clauses suggests that
consumer access to justice-in the case of arbitration, consumer
access to courts-may be shaped by attitudes regarding social policy
(the propriety of consumer arbitration as a means of dispute
resolution), federalism (state versus federal action), and contract law
policy (the role of consent in consumer contracting). In the case of
arbitration, this mix of pressures has led to significantly different
legal responses in the United States and European Union. Nor is the
difference confined solely to consumer arbitration. For example,
attitudes toward informal dispute resolution or legal traditions
regarding class actions may impact the remedies available to
consumers.
Federalism issues such as those surfacing in
interpretations of the FAA by the U.S. Supreme Court and in
implementation of the UTCC Directive also may affect available

certain national "institutional mediation systems" for their pro-business bias, it has
applauded the "positive efforts" realized by "independent arbitration bodies" and
"independent specialized mediators," such as the U.K.'s Ombudsman. UTCC Report,
supra note 174, at 26 (citing Economic and Social Committee Opinion on Consumers
and the Insurance Market, 1998 O.J. (C 95) 72).
274. See, e.g., Carrington & Haagen, supra note 245 (criticizing prevailing
contract approach of Supreme Court); Ware, Consumer Arbitration, supra note 245
(discussing contract and anti-contract perspectives on consumer arbitration); Ware,
Unconscionability, supra note 245 (advocating contractual approach and advancing
arguments for use of unconscionability doctrine to assess validity of arbitration
clauses).
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remedies. In these ways, substantive access to justice issues can be
defined by, and interrelated with, institutional and systems issues
that exist independently of consumer values and ideology.
D. Conclusion
As can be seen from the materials discussed in this Part I, a
comparative institutional perspective on consumer protection law
reveals a wide array of values, political considerations, structural
concerns, systems issues, and cultural factors that potentially
influence final legal responses to consumer protection issues. Even
within narrow substantive areas, approaches sometimes may differ
significantly, as demonstrated by the attitudes toward enforceability
of consumer arbitration clauses in the European Union and United
States just discussed. Yet, even where consumer values coincide
among jurisdictions, as is the case often with respect to deceptive6
advertising27 5 or with respect to unfair contract terms,
significantly different legislative or judicial approaches may emerge
to address the issue. Nor can centralized or localized responses be
necessarily tied to a specific consumer value. While the European
Union and United States hold largely similar values regarding
deception and unfair contract terms, for example, those concerns are
addressed through different localized or centralized responses.
It has been argued that many of these differences may be
related, if only partially, to environmental factors apart from
consumer norms or goals, such as federalization and federalism,
cultural and economic integration, and existing legal and social
systems. This conclusion suggests that the traditional perspective on
consumer protection law, which evaluates law primarily in terms of
the underlying social policy goals it advances, 271 perhaps
overestimates the impact that consumer policy plays in the crafting of
consumer legislation. At the same, the traditional framework
arguably underestimates the impact that legitimate social and
political institutions apart from consumer policy and ideology have on
the decision of whether and how to intervene in consumer
transactions and on the substance of the final legal product. The
following section addresses some of the implications that this
perspective may have on the development of consumer protection law
and theory.

275.
276.
277.

Part IA.

See supra Part IA..
See supra Part I.A.2.
For a discussion of the institutional and traditional perspectives, see supra
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IV. IMPLICATIONS OF INSTITUTIONAL THEORY FOR CONSUMER LAW

The wide-ranging formal legal responses to consumer issues
reflected in the contrast of the U.S. and EU initiatives in the previous
section raise a number of questions for consumer law and theory both
in the United States and internationally. They first test some of the
assumptions on which the current U.S. discourse about consumer
law, if only intuitively, proceeds. They also call into question reliance
on perceived shared policy goals when analyzing and critiquing
recent consumer initiatives. Finally, they point toward whethereven assuming that the current discourse relies upon often flawed
lines of argument-any alternatives exist to proceeding along as in
the past, albeit imperfectly.
The influence that existing institutional factors may have in the
development of consumer law raises again the question, posited
earlier, concerning the proper approach toward formulating and
evaluating legal responses to consumer issues. The prevailing
approach often posits that ostensibly shared values be the dominant,
if not exclusive, basis for evaluating a consumer protection measure.
Thus, for example, under this approach a particular measure such as
the enforcement of arbitration clauses in consumer contracts would
be evaluated on whether such enforcement would advance a
particular consumer value, such as fairness, efficiency, or other
values or goals held to be dominant. 278 Under this rubric, factors
related to the underlying environment from which such measures
emerged, such as institutional constraints, organizational values,
political culture, and social context, are, if not completely irrelevant,
certainly downplayed as less than central to the inquiry. By contrast,
as discussed earlier in Part II, an institutional approach would
employ a much less precise methodology that attempts to
accommodate context, including organizational roles and values
apart from substantive consumer policy or theory, within its overall
framework of analysis. Such an accommodation occurs even at the
2 79
expense of rejecting modern conventions of formal rationality.
The comparative discussion in the previous section highlights
the tenuous assumptions upon which the traditional social policy
model of legal analysis builds. First, the model often assumes that
the values or social policy goals used to evaluate any particular legal
issue or action are widely shared. The comparison of U.S. and EU
consumer protection initiatives, however, suggests that, even across
very similar Western cultures and economies, the premise of shared
values can be a debatable point. For example, the regimes are
beginning to demonstrate substantially different perspectives on

278.
279.

See supra notes 24-33 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying note 51.
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consumer arbitration as a systems value, and that difference
resonates in their consumer law. Even where shared values coincide,
institutional responses legitimately may vary given political or social
considerations. Institutions and organizations matter, as does the
context in which they are formulated and operate. The assumption
that legitimate political and social values apart from substantive
consumer policy do not properly enter into a lannaker's decision to
regulate, and how to regulate, consumer transactions is flawed.
Significant questions therefore exist regarding whether structuring a
discourse around consumer policy values or goals alone either
accurately results in describing fully legislative and legal activity in
the consumer arena or provides a foundation upon which to develop
consumer law in an increasingly pluralist and global environment.
In such an environment, legal responses must be responsive to not
only different values but also to different institutional environments.
From the domestic U.S. perspective, a values-oriented approach
to consumer protection analysis, which eschews the underlying
institutional arrangements and environment in the name of
consumer values alone, therefore needs to be rejected. This is most
particularly the case given the influence that such approaches have
secured in recent years. One can discern some of the underpinnings
of such an approach in many of the debates emerging from the
revisions to the UCC.280 Underlying many critiques of the uniform
laws legislative process in the United States is the suggestion that
individual legislatures have a particular, or perhaps special,
competence in promulgating particular types of consumer protection
laws. For example, in the United States either the federal or state
governments have been suggested to be of significant importance in
protecting consumers.28 1 In a similar argument, it has been
suggested that some legislatures, such as the NCCUSL and ALL,
perhaps are elite institutions, at least comparatively viewed, through
which the "best," or at least "better" consumer protection law should
emerge. 2, 2 Thus, under this argument, in order to attain the desired
goal through legislative action, the question should become merely
one of organizational selection. By reverse implication, if the desired
goal is not obtained through the chosen legislative process, that fact
alone seems authoritatively to speak on legislative competence. In
other words, under this line of analysis because the selection of
lawmaker presumptively was correct, the final product can be
scientifically examined to discern pathologies in the process, such as

280.

See supra text accompanying notes 4-6.

281. See, e.g., Patchel, supra note 4, at 160-62 (suggesting that NCCUSL make
evaluation as to whether state or federal government should enact its consumer
protection provisions in order to ensure high level consumer protection).
282.
See Overby, supra note 4, at 655 (delineating perspectives regarding
qualitative superiority of NCCUSL products).

1286

VANDERBILT/OURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 34:1219

interest group influences or perhaps ineptitude of the body.283 In the
face of those identified pathologies, substantial reform or even
abolishment of the lawmaker may be warranted.
A fair articulation of this extreme critique of the uniform laws
process is that legislatures, courts, and other legal actors involved in
the lawmaking process are producers of products. The lawmaker's
task, as manufacturer, is to align the particular product with shared
social goals, be they paternalism, policing market failure, advancing
efficiency, or ensuring consumer justice. Failure to produce a product
that is aligned with the shared value suggests that the lawmaker
acted for less than legitimate reasons, acted under interest group
influences-whether legitimate or otherwise-or simply got it wrong.
The "legislature as producer," and the connected concept that
desirable law is only a step away from the matter of choosing the
right legislature that knows its job and does it well, is closely linked
to the traditional framework of consumer law analysis advanced
earlier in this Article. 284 By evaluating law and legislative action
largely by how efficaciously their rules advance specific consumer
values, the uniform laws process critique is grounded in the
traditional legal framework set forth above.
These arguments have attained substantial practical impact.
They have, for example, impacted the drafting process for the UCC
revisions, one of the most significant projects impacting commercial
law in the United States. In a debate that has surrounded the
revisions, concerns have been raised over the ability of the uniform
laws process to accommodate the interests of the consumer and the
perceived influence of business interests in the drafting process often
buttressing these arguments by close analysis of the ideological bases
or the bare form of the law produced. 28 5 As discussed above,
however, many of the assumptions that seem to underlie this critique
are, if not critically flawed, certainly tenuous. The weaknesses arise
not only from the issue of whether any consensus upon shared values,
assumed by the argument, in fact exists. More importantly, the view

283.
See Rubin, supra note 4, at 781-88 (substance of revised Articles 3 and 4
evidences interest group influence, should not be enacted, and ALI and NCCUSL
should be reformed or abolished); Rubin, supra note 9, at 1925 (NCCUSL and ALI "are
under the control of merchant interests" and that resulting statute allows for "serious
market failures" due to that control); Schwartz & Scott, supra note 6, at 637-50
(suggesting that interest group influence can be rationally identified through rigorous
analysis of final form of rule generated by lawmaker); Scott, supra note 6, at 1616-22
(arguing that form of rules generated by UCC lawmaking process will be dictated by
interest group power balance during process).
284.
See supra Part II.A.
285.
See generally sources cited supra note 283. Henry D. Gabriel, The Revisions
to the Uniform Commercial Code-Process and Politics, 19 J.L. & COM. 125 (1999)
(providing a detailed discussion of the general parameters of this debate and a
collection of sources reflecting the positions taken).
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that the activity of legislatures, lawmakers, and legal products
readily can be analyzed solely by reference to consumer values and
policy, without reference to other political, institutional, and social
values is highly questionable. As suggested in the previous section,
such an easy comparison cannot obviously be drawn. Consider the
issues that an analysis of the product of the NCCUSL versus that of
the European Union, or that of a Member State of the European
Union, or that of the state or federal government in the United States
in fact raises. It is hard to imagine that such an analysis can proceed
without reference to context and culture, in other words, to
institutional and political values such as federalism, legal and social
culture, attitudes toward-and systems designed to ensure-access to
justice, and other factors completely independent of consumer
ideology but important components of the institutional arrangements
and environment.
Attempting to measure the quality or performance of a
lawmaker principally by a quasi-scientific evaluation of the
normative desirability of its product, another tenet often implicit in
many critiques of the NCCUSL drafting project, is a similarly
questionable enterprise. If the UTCC Directive discussed earlier in
the Article 28 6 were decided to be "better" in terms of protecting the
perceived consumer interest, that fact alone is not dispositive on the
"quality" of the legislative body enacting the legislation. Desirability
alone, in other words, under held values, does not lead logically and
inescapably to the conclusion that the European Commission lacks
interest group pressures or resists them more successfully than the
NCCUSL drafting process does. As suggested above, factors such as
cultural integration and federalism values in fact may impact the
content of the final product. Thus, any coherent and complete
analysis of legislatures and legislative products demands much more
than applying accepted views about efficiency or consumer justice or
any favored and desired consumer goal to the product.
In addition to relying upon debatable assumptions regarding
fungible law and even more fingible lawmakers that exist and create
law independent of any political and social constraints, the valuesoriented approach also often fails to provide guidance on when and
how to create uniformity or to tolerate diversity in consumer law.
While the need for uniformity is a long honored goal of commercial
law codification and harmonization efforts and uniformity generally
is considered beneficial, uniformity and harmonization do have
costs .

87

Consumer law may become largely uniform through a

286. See supra text accompanying notes 173-211.
287. See, e.g., Ribstein & Kobayashi, supra note 6, at 137-41 (discussing benefits
and detriments of uniform state laws); Stephan, supra note 9, at 744-51 (discussing
benefits of harmonization in international law).
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myriad of means, but three general legislative methods have
emerged. At the lowest and highest levels, private institutions such
as the NCCUSL and international bodies such as the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law may play a significant
unifying role by promulgating model or uniform acts for enactment
by public legislatures.2 88
At the federal or quasi-federal level,
institutions such as the Congress in the United States or the EC in
the European Union, may create uniformity through action either by
federal legislation or directive, as the case may be. At all levels, the
failure to act may result in diversity and bring with it values and
costs attained thereby. Rigid assumptions about law as product and
legislature as producer fail to provide any workable rubric for
determining the proper "level" or legal mechanism by which
uniformity should emerge or diversity should be tolerated. 28 9
Beyond the question of the level of government-the local, the
central, or the international-and the mechanism by which desirable
law should emerge, a consumer values approach, finally, fails to
provide standards from which acceptable levels of uniformity or nonuniformity can be identified. As discussed in the previous section,
significant lack of uniformity may emerge as a result of concerns
apart from consumer values alone. For example, preservation of selfregulatory schemes at the local level may occur, such as is the case
with the Misleading Advertising Directive, partially responsive to
concerns over centralization and federalization. A uniform response
may fail due to limited integration across borders as consumer credit
disclosure initiatives in the European Union suggests. Even where
uniformity is possible, it may not be desirable. For example, an
approach that leads to substantial uniformity at the state level in the
United States may not necessarily be viewed as satisfactory to the
extent that a proposed uniform law might marginalize domestic
states from the international community at large. Given that greater
diversity in approaches and attitudes towards consumer issues
inevitably will emerge when issues are viewed across cultures or
globally, the emergence of globalization makes the traditional
emphasis on consumer values seem even more parochial.
In sum, a consumer law discourse that proceeds largely along
consumer social policy goals provides, at best, a woefully incomplete
picture of consumer lawmaking in action. It overlooks key factors
such as federalism, social and cultural values, economic and legal
integration issues, and differing access to justice systems. Yet, those
factors impact the evolution of consumer protection law. At the same

288.
A. Brooke Overby, Will Cyberlaw Be Uniform? An Introduction to the
UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce, 7 TUL. J. OF INT'L & COMP. L. 219
(1999) (discussing harmonization role of UNCTRAL).
289.
Cf Scott, supra note 26 (analyzing whether U.S. common law or state
uniform laws process better promotes goals of uniformity).
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time, it fails to provide a satisfactory framework for assessing the
need for uniformity in commercial law, the level at which uniformity
might be obtained, and the means by which uniformity will emerge,
all issues that will remain increasingly important as globalization
proceeds.
Yet, what alternatives exist to such an approach? What would a
comprehensive, institutional-regarding framework for analysis of
consumer protection law look like? It might begin by returning first
to one premise of institutional analysis, one that rejects as wholly
authoritative Western-and usually U.S.-concepts of formal
rationality. 29 0 Such a move would begin by accepting that consumer
law is shaped as much, if not more, by the underlying governance
structures and institutional environments through which the law
emerges as by held notions of what is right or by the clash of interest
group desires. A perspective based on comprehensive rationality is
not, however, a flight from rationality but rather an attempt to move
towards accommodating within consumer law a comprehensive
perspective on what a truly rational law might look like. 291
Such an institutional approach toward law would adopt a much
broader perspective on legal analysis and law reform than that
advanced by the traditional values-oriented approach. In the specific
area of consumer protection, an institutional and comprehensively
rational framework for evaluating consumer protection would seek to

290.
See supra text accompanying notes 51-54.
291.
The need for new perspectives on the way in which culturally determined
notions of rationality impact legal analysis has been identified, perhaps not
surprisingly, in the international context, as the following statement illustrates:
The more pressing problem for internationalists is to come up with a concept of
rationality that accommodates interchanges between persons from different

cultures. It is all good and well to assert that individuals seek to maxi'mize
their welfare, but what behaviors achieve that end, and therefore receive
positive reinforcement, will vary among cultures. Persons with different
backgrounds-linguistic, historical, class, gender, erotic, or other cultural
determinants-will carry with them different intuitions and understandings of
what makes sense. When these people interact, they either will be doomed to
misunderstanding, or they will learn new conceptions of rationality that take
into account the other's different characteristics. If an internationalist is to use
the concept, then special care must be taken to avoid culture-bound conceptions
of rationality.
Paul B. Stephan I, Barbarians Inside the Gate.
Public Choice Theoty and
InternationalEconomic Law, 10 AML U. J. INT'L L. & POLVY 745, 751 (1995). While the
above quotation implies problems with applying concepts of 'rationahty* and with
communication across seemingly radically different cultures, for example between the

developed countries of the West and developing countries of the Third World, such a
comprehensively rational approach is, in the author's view, equally applicable even

where similar environments are at issue, as the discussion of the EU and United States
in this Article demonstrates, and even where, in spite of cultural homogenization in
certain areas, significantly different perspectives on orienting values exist, such as is
the case with United States consumer protection law internally.
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take into account the organizations and the institutions that guide
and constrain them, as well as values and concerns such as
federalism, integration, and existing social and legal systems, when
making any assessment of a particular consumer protection issue.
Instead of rejecting these factors as inconsequential in the way that
the traditional approach so frequently does, an institutional approach
would validate such concerns as legitimate considerations to be
weighed when addressing consumer lawmaking and to be employed
in legal analysis of consumer protection initiatives.
To provide two examples of how such a comprehensively rational
and institutional analysis of consumer protection might proceed,
consider first the debates that have surrounded the NCCUSL and the
UCC revision process, discussed above. Evaluation of a NCCUSL
consumer protection issue under a new institutional framework
would proceed within a matrix of the role that NCCUSL plays in the
state, national, and global lawmaking process, of federalism values,
of local state culture and legal systems, and of the historical
development of the uniform laws process. Values such as interstate
uniformity, legal diversity, state autonomy in regulating the subject
areas, federalism concerns, organizational integrity, and integration
among the states would be important considerations when evaluating
any particular UCC provision, in addition to consumer ideology and
contract law theory. This is not to suggest that consumer and
contract values are irrelevant even under an institutional framework,
but rather that any failure to advance specific values through a rule,
or to express those values through a particular form of rule, does not
end the inquiry or prove in and of itself much regarding the law or
lawmaker.
The differing treatment of consumer arbitration clauses in the
United States and European Union suggests another example for
how an institutional dialogue might proceed. 2 92
The UTCC
Directive's gray-list approach recognizes the consumer concerns with
arbitration as a means of dispute resolution by presumptively
invalidating such clauses. By contrast, the United States broadly
validates arbitration clauses under the rubric of freedom of contract,
with the domestic argument largely devolving into one of whether or
not enforcement is sound as a matter of consumer policy. An
institutional approach toward consumer arbitration would bring into
the debate issues of federalization, preemption, and state autonomy
in regulating contracts. Moreover, the fact that EU entities recognize
consumer concerns rejected frequently in the U.S. approach would
not be regarded as inconsequential.
Such an institutional framework for developing and critiquing
consumer law holds greater promise for broader application than a

292.

See supra Part III.C.
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values-based approach, thereby circumventing the parochialism of
the latter approach. The institutional model provides a framework
for analyzing consumer law that is capable of working across political
boundaries. By providing a matrix through which local institutional
environments and governance structures that impact consumer
lawmaking are taken into account, an institutional framework
remains sensitive to cultural difference and local political values
while providing a mechanism for comparative assessment of
consumer law. Thus, fully developed, it holds the promise of being
capable of guiding lawmakers on when uniformity is acceptable while
remaining respectful of local culture, issues of increasing
consequence in a quickly shrinking world.

V. CONCLUSION
This Article has examined recent consumer protection initiatives
in the United States and European Union to identify values and
institutional factors other than purely consumer policy values that
may act to shape consumer protection law. The wide disparity in
approaches toward misleading advertising, unfair contract terms,
consumer credit issues, and access to justice problems demonstrates
that institutional constraints and culture may play a much stronger
role in determining the shape and scope of consumer protection law
than perhaps previously thought. Values such as federalism and
federalization, organizational competence and constraints, economic
and cultural integration, and existing systems do impact the shape
and form of consumer law. Thus, the prevailing framework for
evaluating consumer law is flawed when it assumes, as it all too
frequently does, that factors such as these are largely irrelevant. An
institutional legal approach that would give weight to the differing
functions that lawmaking bodies play in local contexts in the global
community, to economic and social integration factors, and to existing
legal systems provides a better methodology by which to critique
consumer law and to formulate new consumer protection initiatives
in an era of globalization.
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